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BRANDED PRESCRIPTION pharmaceutical manufacturers in re-
cent years have gone to great lengths to delay the market entry of less
expensive, but otherwise functionally identical, generic versions of
their brand-name products. Delaying tactics have included, among
others, paying generic companies not to sell their less expensive com-
peting products as part of final or interim "settlements" of patent liti-
gation. Tactics have also allegedly included gaming the drug approval
process overseen by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration ("FDA"),1
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1. These tactics have specifically included branded manufacturers, fraudulently or
otherwise, improperly listing their brand-name products in the FDA's "Orange Book," as
part of alleged schemes to delay generic competition. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION &
RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVA-
LENCE EVALUATIONS (24th ed. 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/pref
ace/ecpreface.htm (last accessed Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter ORANGE BOOK]. The FDA's
Orange Book was initially published to support the implementation of state generic-substi-
tution laws and was subsequently mandated by the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codi-
fied in scattered portions of 21 & 35 U.S.C.). The Orange Book lists "all prescription drug
products that are approved by the FDA for safety and effectiveness, along with therapeutic
equivalence determinations for multisource prescription products" and "provides patent
information concerning the listed drugs which also may delay the approval of [Abbreviated
New Drug Applications ("ANDAs")] or Section 505(b)(2) applications." ORANGE BOOK,
supra.
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fraudulently procuring and enforcing patents, and filing sham patent
infringement suits against generic manufacturers-conduct designed
to invoke "stays" of FDA marketing approval of generic drugs or to
otherwise deter generic competition to brand-name products. 2 Be-
cause generic drugs are often substantially less expensive than their
brand-name counterparts and because generics tend to rapidly re-
place sales of the corresponding brand, delaying generic entry en-
riches branded manufacturers at the expense of pharmaceutical
purchasers and the public.
Introduction
The practice of retarding generic competition has recently taken
on increased importance from a public policy perspective, particularly
in light of the substantial and rapidly-growing impact of drug prices
on aggregate healthcare costs in this country.3 Allegedly improper tac-
tics used to delay generic entry have also become a significant focus of
both United States government antitrust enforcement and private
suits by direct purchasers, third-party payors, consumers, and state at-
2. Such tactics, which form the central allegations in several of the antitrust lawsuits
discussed in this Article, have for years constituted actionable conduct under the federal
antitrust laws. See, e.g., Prof l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
508 U.S. 49 (1993) (objectively groundless lawsuits instituted for anticompetitive purpose
not afforded antitrust immunity as protected government petitioning); Walker Process
Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (enforcement of fraudu-
lently obtained patent through baseless infringement litigation exposes patentee to liability
under section 2 of Sherman Act); In re Remeron Prods. Antitrust Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d
522, 531-32 (D.N.J. 2004) (permitting claims of direct purchasers relating to the alleged
gaming of the FDA approval process to delay the entry of generic competition to go for-
ward as part of an overall scheme to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act).
3. According to a recent report from the Kaiser Family Foundation, drug expendi-
tures are a substantial component of health expenditures (5.8% in 1992 and 10.5% in
2002) and are by far the fastest growing component of health care costs. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE, at Exhibits
1.5, 1.6, & 1.7 (2004), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/index.cfm (last ac-
cessed Oct. 25, 2004). Ajoint study by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department
of Justice has similarly found:
In the last few years . . . dramatic cost increases have returned, attributable to
both increased use of and increased prices for health care services. Inpatient hos-
pital care and pharmaceuticals are the key drivers of recent increases in expendi-
tures. These trends are likely to continue-and even accelerate-as new
technologies are developed and the percentage of the population that is elderly
increases.
FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPE-
TITION 3 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.
pdf (last accessed Oct. 25, 2004).
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torneys general.4 These parties have sought, among other things, com-
pensation for the artificially inflated prices resulting from such tactics.
This Article will examine two related underlying issues funda-
mental to much of the federal antitrust litigation spawned by the de-
laying tactics described above: whether conduct delaying generic entry
(1) yields what the law traditionally considers "anticompetitive ef-
fects," under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 5, and (2) whether such
conduct reflects the creation or maintenance of "monopoly power"
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.6 To establish a violation of Sec-
tion 1, where the restraint of trade in question is not deemed per se
illegal, 7 private plaintiffs and governmental enforcement authorities
are required to demonstrate that delaying generic entry results in "an-
ticompetitive effects" (i.e., prices are raised above competitive levels)
in demonstrating an unreasonable restraint of trade under the "rule
of reason."8 Similarly, proof of a violation of Section 2 requires,
among other things, a showing that the underlying conduct involved
the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.9 As will be shown
below, the concepts of anticompetitive effects on the one hand, and
the exercise of monopoly power, on the other, are really two sides of
4. Such practices have also been the subject of a good deal of scholarly debate and
discussion, especially in cases involving payments from branded to generic manufacturers
in exchange for the generic's agreement to refrain from coming to market as part of in-
terim or final "settlements" of patent litigation (so-called "reverse payments" agreements).
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION 25-52 (July
2002); David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 321 (2000); Joseph F. Brodley & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Patent Settlement Agreements, 16
ANTITRUST, Summer 2002 at 53; Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intel-
lectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003); Keith B. Leffler & Cristofer Leffler,
Want to Pay a Competitor to Exit the Market? Settle a Patent Infringement Case, 2 ABA ANTITRUST
SEC. ECON. COMM. NEWSLETTER (2002); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of Patent Settlements
Between Rivals, 17 ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 70; Kevin D. MacDonald, Hatch-Waxman
Settlements and Antitrust: On Probabilistic Patent Rights and False Positives, 17 ANTITRUST, Spring
2003, at 68; FAMILIES USA, COLLUSION AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES: A SURVEY OF
CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AGAINST DRUG MANUFACTURERS 7-8 (3d ed. Jan. 2004), at http://
www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/3rdedition-lawsuit.surveys.pmd.pdf (last accessed
Aug. 28, 2004) (cataloging various private antitrust cases against drug manufacturers).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
6. Id. §2.
7. Courts appear to have split on whether agreements entered into by branded and
generic manufacturers to delay generic entry should be viewed as straightforward market
allocation agreements subject to the per se rule. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332
F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the per se rule); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (1lth Cir. 2003) (applying certain conditions to the applicability of the
per se rule).
8. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457-59 (1986).
9. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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the same coin (the latter results in the former; the former flows from
the latter). In delayed generic entry cases, where direct proof of the
anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct is available, the two
concepts are appropriately analyzed in the same fashion.
This Article focuses on the two basic and distinct methods of
proving these threshold elements of antitrust claims under Section 1
(anticompetitive effects) and Section 2 (monopoly power) of the
Sherman Act. These distinct methods of analysis are commonly re-
ferred to as the "direct" and "indirect" methods of proving monopoly
power and anticompetitive effects.
The direct methodology involves demonstrating with direct evi-
dence that the alleged restraint of trade in question resulted in the
inflation of prices above the level that would have prevailed in a com-
petitive market.'0 Thus, for instance, evidence showing that cessation
of the alleged anticompetitive conduct (i.e., allowing generic competi-
tors to enter the market) led directly to substantially lower prices or
increased output (or both) would be direct proof that that conduct (1)
had anticompetitive effects pursuant to Section 1 and (2) constituted
the exercise of monopoly power under Section 2.11
10. See Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 456-57 (using direct evidence to conclude
challenged conduct "impairs the ability of the market to advance social welfare by ensuring
the provision of desired goods and services to consumers at a price approximating the
marginal cost of providing them"); Toys "R" Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000)
(using defendant's ability to restrict output and thereby raise prices as proof of market
power); Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Ad. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.1995) ("If the
plaintiff puts forth evidence of restricted output and supracompetitive prices, that is direct
proof of the injury to competition which a competitor with market power may inflict, and
thus, of the actual exercise of market power."); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating if "evidence indicates that a firm has in fact" profitably
raised prices substantially above the competitive level, "the existence of monopoly power is
clear"). As Justice Harlan once observed, the "clearest evil of monopoly is the excessive
power the monopolist has over price." FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 597
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
11. Cf Virgin Ad. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001) (in
case under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, comparing competitive conditions where
alleged anticompetitive conduct is present and where such conduct is absent); In re Shop-
ping Carts Antitrust Litig., 95 F.R.D. 299, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("If an economically effective
price conspiracy takes place over a long period of time and the industry suddenly becomes
competitive, then ordinarily sales and profits of individual companies will change sud-
denly. A dramatic and sudden change might tend to indicate that a conspiracy did exist
.... "); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 251, 254 (N.D. Ill. 1978). In re Folding
Carton states:
If an economically effective price conspiracy takes place over a long period of
time and the industry suddenly becomes competitive, then profits and prices are
expected to fall. A dramatic fall in prices in the last years of a conspiracy and the
post-conspiracy period may indicate the presence of a price-fixing conspiracy ....
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The indirect method involves proving monopoly power and an-
ticompetitive effects using circumstantial evidence. 12 For instance, in
Section 2 cases generally, courts have traditionally permitted claim-
ants to meet their burden of establishing maintenance or creation of
monopoly power by first defining a "relevant product market" or "rel-
evant market"13 and subsequently showing that the defendant firm
possesses a dominant share of that market. Courts then permit fact-
finders to draw the inference that where a firm possesses a dominant
share of a properly defined relevant market it has monopoly power,
i.e., the power to inflate its price substantially above competitive levels.
Similarly, in the context of Section 1 cases, the same kind of cir-
cumstantial evidence can be employed to show that the alleged con-
spiracy in restraint of trade had (or would have) anticompetitive
effects. This essentially amounts to showing that the conspiracy would
enhance the firms' combined share of a properly defined relevant
market, permitting the inference that they would maintain a higher
combined market share, thereby supplementing the firms' joint mar-
ket power. This, then, permits the additional inference that by exercis-
ing this combined market power, prices would be inflated above
competitive levels-a result otherwise known as anticompetitive
effects.
Where direct proof of market power and anticompetitive effects
is available, it is considered the most straightforward-and should be
the preferred-mode of proof. Yet, despite well-reasoned authorita-
12. See Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571 ("The existence of such [monopoly] power ordi-
narily may be inferred form the predominant share of the market."); E. Food Servs., Inc. v.
Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass'n, 357 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (conventional way to
determine whether the relevant actor or combination has sufficient percentage share of a
"relevant market" is to give it power to raise prices or enter into arrangements to exclude
competitors); Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc., v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d
182, 196-97 (1st Cir. 1996) (using circumstantial evidence of market shares to prove mo-
nopoly power in Section 2 case); Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1434.
13. The indirect method of proof can involve proof of a relevant "geographic market"
as well. See, e.g., E. Food Serws., 357 F.3d at 6-7. Indeed, "[t]he criteria to be used in deter-
mining the appropriate geographic market are essentially similar to those used to deter-
mine the relevant product market." Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962).
A geographic market is "the area of effective competition." Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty
One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). It is defined to be the "region such that a
hypothetical monopolist that was the only present or future producer of the relevant prod-
uct at locations in that region would profitably impose at least a 'small but significant and
nontransitory' increase in price." DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.21 (1997) [hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N,
MERGER GUIDELINES]. Among other reasons, because of the applicability of federal regula-
tions pertaining to the sale and marketing of prescription drugs, there has been no dispute
in delayed generic entry cases that the relevant geographic market is the United States.
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tive support for reliance upon direct proof where it is available, some
practitioners in the field, including pharmaceutical industry defend-
ers, continue to insist that an indirect methodology is required. Indus-
try defenders have exploited the unfortunate tendency of both courts
and commentators, in setting forth the elements of Sherman Act Sec-
tion 1 and Section 2 claims, to recite, often indiscriminately, the "ne-
cessity" of defining a "relevant market."14 This supposed universal
"requirement" arose, in part, because most reported cases involve one
competitor suing another. In such cases, unambiguous direct proof of
harm to competition as opposed to harm of the complainant competitors
themselves, which is the appropriate focus of antitrust analysis, 15 is
rarely available. 16 Indeed, the type of unambiguous direct evidence of
market power in delayed generic entry cases is likely unprecedented
in the universe of large scale, contested litigation. Despite the availa-
bility of this evidence in delayed generic entry cases, relevant market
definition analysis has nevertheless been ripped from its moorings to
be used in a wholly different context as a platform to try to defeat
antitrust claims brought by purchasers armed with direct evidence of
harm to competition in the form of supracompetitive pricing.
Although the direct and indirect methods are not contradictory,
and indeed if properly applied should yield the same conclusions
about the presence or absence of market power, industry defenders
have nevertheless attempted to use the indirect method as a means to
negate (or at minimum blur) the undeniable implications of the di-
rect proof in delayed generic entry cases. It is observed that most
brand-name drugs occupy therapeutic classes consisting of a number
of other drugs that treat the same condition or disease and that a
single brand rarely dominates a class. By arguing that the "relevant
14. See, e.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("Defining the relevant market is an indispensable element of any monopolization or at-
tempt case, for it is the market in which competition is affected by the asserted predatory
or anticompetitive acts."); Am. Bearing Co., Inc. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 943, 949
(3d Cir. 1984) ("The market power analysis begins with a definition of the relevant prod-
uct market for the particular product and is an element of a section 2 violation that plain-
tiff must establish to prevail. Without a definition of the relevant market, the defendant's
ability to exclude competitors cannot be determined.").
15. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham, P.L.C. v. Apotex Corp., 2004 WL 2222388, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2004) ("The antitrust laws ...were enacted for 'the protection of
competition not competitors .... ' (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 320 (1962)).
16. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANAL-
YSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION & 531a (2d ed. 1995); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("direct proof [of monopoly power] is
only rarely available").
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market" should include all of these "competing" drugs, industry de-
fenders can improperly derive a conclusion completely at odds with
the direct evidence, namely that delaying generic entry does not and
cannot involve maintenance of substantial market (i.e., monopoly)
power and, thus, does not and cannot yield anticompetitive effects.i7
This Article seeks to clarify the conceptual confusion inherent in
requiring a burdensome and potentially diversionary indirect test of
market power and anticompetitive effects in the context of delayed
generic entry cases where unambiguous direct proof is available. In a
Section 1 case nearly twenty years ago, the Supreme Court in Federal
Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists18 made clear that
"elaborate market analysis," including defining a relevant market, is
not required where direct evidence of anticompetitive effects is availa-
ble.19 Based on similar reasoning, courts have drawn precisely the
same conclusion in relatively recent cases relating to the appropriate
use of direct proof of monopoly power under Section 2 as well.20
These holdings strongly suggest that the tendency of courts and com-
mentators to incorporate a "relevant market" requirement reflexively
when reciting the elements of a Sherman Act claim is inapplicable in
cases, like delayed generic entry cases, where direct proof is available
and abundant.
Indeed, the direct evidence that the branded firm maintains
prices above levels that prevail post-generic entry only by delaying ge-
neric entry is not even typically in material dispute in these cases.21 A
typical statement in the economic literature is as follows: "[T]he aver-
17. In effect, pharmaceutical company lawyers have argued that antitrust enforcers,
both public and private, should disregard the fact that delaying generic entry delays the
clear competitive benefits that generics invariably bring in assessing whether such conduct
violates the Sherman Act.
18. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
19. Id. at 460-61.
20. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 52 (if "evidence indicates that a firm has in
fact" profitably raised prices substantially above the competitive level, "the existence of
monopoly power is clear"); Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1018 (6th
Cir. 1999) (stating that monopoly power can be established "when there is direct evidence
that the defendant has actually set prices or excluded competition"); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atd.
Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) states:
Market power may be demonstrated through either of two types of proof. One
type of proof is direct evidence of the injurious exercise of market power. If the
plaintiff puts forth evidence of restricted output and supracompetitive prices, that
is direct proof of the injury to competition which a competitor with market power
may inflict, and thus, of the actual exercise of market power.
21. In the context of cases in which the brand manufacturer pays generic manufactur-
ers large exclusion payments in exchange for the generics' agreement to refrain from mar-
keting, Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley have written: "The very fact that the
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age price of a drug is likely to fall after generic entry because the
generic price of a drug can be substantially lower than the brand-
name price and the generic can capture a large share of sales of a
drug shortly after generic entry."22 Based on this consensus, the court
in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.23 rightly concluded as
follows: "the anticompetitive effects of [delaying the entry of generic terazosin]
cannot be seriously debated."24
Given this context, it is quite simply illogical to require an indirect
analysis of monopoly power or anticompetitive effects in delayed ge-
neric entry cases. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") itself re-
cently, and unanimously, came to precisely the same conclusion in a
delayed generic entry case, reversing the administrative law judge who
followed the industry's preferred indirect approach. 25 The FTC got it
exactly right.
In cases where there is abundant and largely unambiguous direct
evidence about the anticompetitive effects of generic competition, the
antitrust analysis, in both Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 cases,
should focus on that direct evidence. This is because the whole point
of an indirect relevant market analysis is to create a framework for
determining whether the challenged conduct has the capacity to cause
anticompetitive effects, such as by maintaining artificially inflated
prices. It elevates form over substance, then, to focus on an indirect
means of analyzing potential or possible anticompetitive effects of an
alleged restraint of trade-inviting confusion and increasing the like-
lihood of getting the wrong result-when direct evidence of actual
anticompetitive effects not only exists, but where the effects are
known and undisputed.
pioneer finds it worthwhile to pay a large exclusion payment tends to establish market
power." Hovenkamp et al., supra note 4, at 1757.
22. This statement was authored by James Langenfeld, an economist serving as a testi-
monial expert for the pharmaceutical defendants in In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2004). It exemplifies the consensus that has
emerged regarding the competitive effects of generic competition. James Langenfeld et al.,
Intellectual Property and Agreements To Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements
With Payments From Branded to Generic Drug Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 778 n.5
(2002).
23. 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
24. Id. at 1311 n.27 (emphasis added).
25. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *30-*31,
*41-*47 (Dec. 8, 2003) (where anticompetitive effects of delaying generic entry are well
known and understood, there is no need to define a relevant market), appealfiled, No. 04-
10688 (l1th Cir. Feb. 13, 2004).
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Part I of this Article begins by examining how the concepts of
monopoly power and anticompetitive effects are defined in the fields
of law and economics. It then examines the two methods of assessing
the presence of monopoly power and anticompetitive effects: the di-
rect and indirect modes of analysis. The Article then argues that
where direct evidence of the impact of delaying generic entry on drug
prices not only exists, but is unambiguous and uncontroversial, an in-
direct market analysis involving defining a relevant market is wholly
unnecessary.
Part I continues by explaining that indirect market power analy-
sis, if undertaken, can obscure and confuse the underlying competi-
tive issues in delayed generic entry cases. This is true both in cases
brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (alleging unilateral con-
duct) and those brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (alleg-
ing conspiracy).
Part I then concludes by demonstrating that the same direct evi-
dence of anticompetitive effects of delaying generic entry, namely, the
forestalling of the substantially reduced price levels that generic com-
petition for a given drug compound invariably yields, necessarily im-
plies a relevant product market that is limited to the brand-name drug
and its generic FDA-related therapeutic equivalents, 26 often referred
to collectively in the pharmaceutical industry as the "molecule mar-
ket." Thus, even if defining a "relevant market" were required, there
would be no need to go through the motions of referring to or analyz-
ing circumstantial indicia of whether various products are "reasonably
interchangeable," and thus belong in the relevant market. Put simply,
the Article shows that reference to circumstantial evidence is unlikely
to provide pertinent additional information in delayed generic entry
cases and more than likely serves to obscure competitive issues rather
than elucidate them.
Next, in Part II, the Article goes on to explain that, if performed
correctly, the indirect approach should confirm the validity of the re-
sult that the direct evidence reveals. In this section, the Article de-
scribes in some detail the key institutional features of the
pharmaceutical business, focusing on the legal and regulatory back-
drop that set the framework for competition in the industry. The Arti-
cle provides an overview of the applicable web of laws, regulations,
26. The FDA classifies products as therapeutically equivalent if they are both pharma-
ceutically equivalent (in that they contain the same amount of the same active ingredient
in the same dosage form) and bioequivalent (in that they are absorbed at the same rate,
and to the same extent). See ORANGE BOOK, supra note 1, §§ 1.2, 1.7.
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and institutional features, discussing (1) why it is that, absent generic
competition, prices for a particular drug compound or active ingredi-
ent (i.e., "the molecule") tend to remain well above competitive levels,
(2) why generic competition tends to have such significant ameliora-
tive effects on prices, and thus (3) why the circumstantial evidence
confirms that the market is the molecule.
Finally, in Part III, the Article discusses the industry defenders'
argument that, when analyzing the pharmaceutical industry, one
should essentially abandon traditional measures of market power due
to the purportedly high "fixed," up-front, research and development
costs, and the presence of marketing exclusivities flowing from pat-
ents or the Hatch-Waxman regulatory scheme. 27 Defenders observe
that if traditional definitions of monopoly power were employed, for
instance, all brands would be "monopolies" in purported violation of
the Sherman Act. They argue, therefore, that strict antitrust enforce-
ment could shut down the entire industry.
The Article points out, first, that this position is, at root, a funda-
mental acknowledgement that delaying generic entry permits
branded companies to maintain market power and charge supracom-
petitive prices with obvious anticompetitive effects. Indeed, the appar-
ent point of this argument is that monopoly power, supracompetitive
prices, and anticompetitive effects should be tolerated, at least in the
short-run, in order to further the supposed long-run and dynamic effi-
ciency goals of the patent laws and the regulatory scheme.
The Article then concludes by addressing the substance of the
industry argument directly pointing out (1) that a finding that a firm
possesses monopoly power (or that joint conduct enhances market
power and causes anticompetitive effects), standing alone, does not
an antitrust violation make; also required is a determination that the
challenged conduct was "willful" and/or unprotected by legitimate in-
tellectual property or other exclusivity rights; and (2) if the allegations
in delayed generic entry cases that patent or exclusivity rights were
somehow improperly obtained and/or enforced are proven true, a de-
fendant firm has no basis to rely upon those "rights" to defend its
enhanced market power and the anticompetitive effects that such
market power creates.
27. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered portions of 21 & 35 U.S.C.).
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I. Assessment of Monopoly Power and Anticompetitive
Effects in Delayed Generic Entry Cases
This section begins with a brief discussion of the tactics that
branded companies have used to try to delay or block generic compe-
tition and the underlying antitrust foundation of the litigation these
tactics have spawned. It then presents the conceptual framework for
the discussion of "monopoly power" and "anticompetitive effects," ex-
plaining that these terms are essentially two sides of the same coin,
followed by a discussion of the prevailing methodologies for assessing
monopoly power and anticompetitive effects in the context of delayed
generic entry cases.
A. Types of Delayed Generic Entry Cases: Concerted Action and
Unilateral Conduct
Most of the recent antirust litigation relating to delayed generic
entry falls into two basic categories: (1) cases challenging agreements
in which branded manufacturers pay generic companies to refrain
from competing, either in connection with a settlement of patent liti-
gation or pending the outcome of ongoing patent litigation, 28 and (2)
unilateral action by branded companies designed to exclude or delay
generic competition, such as by fraudulently obtaining and enforcing
invalid patents and improperly listing them in the FDA's "Orange
Book" as a means to gain the benefits of Hatch-Waxman's thirty-
month stay of generic competition. 29
28. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d 1294; In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d
896 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188
(E.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121 (E.D.N.Y.
2003); In re Buspirone Patent & Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dis-
cussing an agreement between branded manufacturer and generic manufacturer, in addi-
tion to unilateral conduct by branded manufacturer); Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of
Greater Phila. v. Elan Corp., P.L.C., No. CIV.A.02-CV-2095, 2003 WL 22358451 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 5, 2003) (discussing an agreement between brand manufacturer and generic manu-
facturer regarding Naprelan (naproxen sodium), in addition to unilateral conduct by
brand manufacturer); In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187 (Dec.
8, 2003). Cases alleging agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act do not arise exclusively from agreements between brand drug manufacturers
and generic drug manufacturers; combinations of generic manufacturers have been the
subject of such lawsuits as well. See In re Nifedipine Antitrust Litig., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1382
(J.P.M.L. 2003); In re Lorazepam & Chlorazepate Antitrust Litig., 202 F.R.D. 12 (D.D.C.
2001).
29. See Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2004) (Taxol
(paclitaxel)); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 286 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D. Mass. 2003); Organon,
Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc. 293 F. Supp. 2d 453 (D.N.J. 2003) (Remeron (mirtazapine));
Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham, P.L.C., No. CIV.A.00-6222, 2003 WL 302352 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
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Antitrust claims in these two categories are brought under differ-
ent provisions of the Sherman Act. The first type, involving alleged
restraints in the form of conspiracies or agreements, is covered by Sec-
tion 1.30 The second type, involving unilateral conduct, is covered by
Section 2, which prohibits monopolization and attempted monopo-
lization. 31
To prevail on a Section 1 claim, a plaintiff must show (1) con-
certed action that results in unreasonable restraint of trade, and (2)
injury to business or property as a result of the concerted conduct.3 2
For a Section 2 case, the elements are typically stated as follows: (1)
possession of monopoly power in a relevant market; (2) willful acquisi-
29, 2003) (Paxil (paroxetine)); In re Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 366; FED. TRADE COMM'N,
supra note 4, at 39-56; FAmILIES USA, supra note 4, at 7-8 (cataloging various private anti-
trust cases against drug manufacturers). Because the 180-day exclusivity period offered as
an incentive to the first generic to file an ANDA for a specific drug listed in the Orange
Book will not begin to run until that generic manufacturer first sells its product, postpon-
ing the commencement of the 180-day exclusivity period through collusive conduct or
sham litigation may also serve to lock out all generic manufacturers from the market. See
FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 4, at vii, 26.
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony ....
Id.
31. Id. § 2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
32. See, e.g., Denny's Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir.
1993) ("A successful claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof of three
elements: (1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) a resultant unreasonable re-
straint of trade in the relevant market; and (3) an accompanying injury."); Austin v. McNa-
mara, 979 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir. 1992). Austin states:
To establish a Section 1 violation under the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must demon-
strate three elements: (1) an agreement, conspiracy, or combination among two
or more persons or distinct business entities; (2) which is intended to harm or
unreasonably restrain competition; and (3) which actually causes injury to com-
petition, beyond the impact on the claimant, within a field of commerce in which
the claimant is engaged (i.e., 'antitrust injury').
Id.; see also Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The elements
required to state a Section 1 claim are: (1) the existence of a conspiracy (2) affecting
interstate commerce (3) that imposes an unreasonable restraint of trade."); Fuentes v. S.
Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Three elements must be alleged to
sustain a cause of action under section 1 of the Sherman Act... a contract, combination or
conspiracy; a restraint of trade; and an effect on interstate commerce.").
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tion or maintenance of that power; and (3) injury to business or prop-
erty as a result.
33
Section 1 cases involving conduct deemed to be per se illegal,
such as certain horizontal price fixing and market allocation activi-
ties, 34 require no assessment of whether the challenged conduct re-
sulted in maintenance or creation of substantial market power or
whether the challenged conduct yielded anticompetitive effects. 35 Be-
cause courts are deemed to have had sufficient experience with re-
straints of trade such as horizontal price-fixing and market allocation,
the law permits courts to presume that such conduct would yield an-
ticompetitive effects without requiring specific proof.3 6 Where the per
se rule is not applicable, however, and the conduct is analyzed under
the "rule of reason," one must assess the ability of the challenged con-
33. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (reciting first two
elements); Rural Tel. Service Co. v. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 957 F.2d 765, 768 (10th Cir. 1992)
(noting presence of third element); Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp.,
910 F.2d 139, 147 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1979).
34. Whether delayed generic entry cases involving "reverse payment" agreements,
under which brand companies pay generics not to come to market for certain periods of
time or during the pendency of patent litigation, should be analyzed as a per se violation of
Section 1 has been the source of controversy and debate. Compare In re Cardizem CD Anti-
trust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding reverse payments to be per se violations
of the Sherman Act), with Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th
Cir. 2003) (applying conditions to the possible applicability of the per se rule), and In re
Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187 (Dec. 8, 2003) (holding that re-
verse payments are adjudicable under quick-look analysis and reconciling In re Cardizem
and Valley Drug), and In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d
188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). The debate has also split the academic community. Compare
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 4, with MacDonald, supra note 4.
35. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
109-10 (1984). This case states:
As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked
restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when there is an agreement not to
compete in terms of price or output, "no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement." ... We have
never required proof of market power in such a case.
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S.
411, 430-31 (1990) ("If small parties were allowed to prove lack of market power, all par-
ties would have that right, thus introducing the enormous complexities of market defini-
tion into every price-fixing case." (internal quotations omitted)). Judge Bork has also
suggested that a firm's willingness to enter into an agreement to fix prices is itself proof of
market power. ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRusr PARADox 269 (1993) ("Very few firms that
lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently foolish to enter into conspiracies to
fix prices. Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market.").
36. See, e.g., Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 430 (price fixing); United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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duct to result in anticompetitive effects or whether the conduct actu-
ally has resulted in such effects.
3 7
B. Monopoly Power and Anticompetitive Effects: The Conceptual
Framework
The Supreme Court has defined monopoly power as "the power
to control prices or exclude competition."3 8 According to a standard
economics text: "Whenever a firm can influence the price it receives
for its product, the firm is said to have monopoly power (sometimes
called market power)."39 The existence of monopoly power presents an
important public policy issue-and has been addressed as a national
social, economic, and legal concern for over one hundred years-
principally because of the social costs associated with the exercise of
monopoly power.40 Over the history of the antitrust laws, these social
costs have been expressed primarily in economic terms.41 In general,
the exercise of monopoly power permits an incumbent firm to raise or
stabilize the price of its product significantly above competitive levels
and causes a misallocation of productive resources. 42
Economists and courts often use the terms "market power" and
"monopoly power" interchangeably.43 Both terms mean "the ability
profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant
period of time."'4 4 Some courts define "monopoly power" as "substan-
tial market power."45 "Substantial market power" exists where a firm
can maintain price substantially above the competitive level without a
significant loss of sales due to consumer resistance (or competition) .46
37. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
38. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
39. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
137 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter CARLTON & PERLOFF, SECOND EDITION]; see also 2A AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, & 525.
40. 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, 502.
41. Id. 101.
42. Id. 502.
43. See CARLTON & PEPLOFF, SECOND EDITION, supra note 39, at 137.
44. DEP'T OFJUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 0.1;
see also 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, 501; William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 937, 939 (1981).
45. See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 966 (10th
Cir. 1990); Carpet Group Int'l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass'n, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 249,
286-87 & n.32 (D.N.J. 2003).
46. See The Package Shop, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 894, 939-40
(D.NJ. 1987) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) ("Market power is the ability to raise prices
above those that would be charged in a competitive market."); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[A] firm is a monopolist if it can profitably raise
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To the extent that there is a distinction between market power
and monopoly power, it reflects, in part, a recognition that market
power exists on a continuum, ranging from its complete absence-
perfect competition-to its fullest manifestation-a true sole-seller
monopolist.47 Given that nearly every firm has a small degree of mar-
ket power, for market power to raise antitrust concerns, it must reflect
a substantial level of power over pricing.48 In its influential merger
guidelines, which discuss the issue of market power at length, the De-
partment of Justice generally defines this threshold as the ability to
raise prices profitably, in a non-transitory fashion, approximately five
percent above the level that would otherwise exist.49
In the antitrust context, the term "anticompetitive effects," refers
to the economic conditions that flow from the exercise of substantial
market power. The requirements of demonstrating anticompetitive ef-
fects under Section 1 (through the accumulation and exercise of mar-
ket power due to concerted action) or the axercise of monopoly
power under Section 2 effectively mirror one another because the
concepts of monopoly power and anticompetitive effects are two sides
of the same coin. Where prices in a marketplace can be shown to de-
part substantially from that which would exist under competitive con-
ditions due to the restraint of trade in question, one can safely
prices substantially above the competitive level."); U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus.,
Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 994 (lth Cir. 1993) ("Monopoly power is 'the power to raise prices to
supra-competitive levels .... .'" (internal citation omitted)); Am. Academic Suppliers, Inc.
v. Beckley-Cardy, Inc., 922 F.2d 1317, 1319 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[Mlonopoly power [is] the
power to charge a price higher than the competitive price . . . ."); Thomas G. Krat-
tenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 247
(1987) ("Economists use both 'market power' and 'monopoly power' to refer to the power
of a single firm or group of firms to price profitably above marginal cost .... We believe
that antitrust law should dispense with the idea that market power and monopoly power
are different concepts.").
47. 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, 501.
48. See Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182,
196 (1st Cir. 1996) ("'Substantial market power that concerns antitrust law arises when the
defendant (1) can profitably set prices well above its costs and (2) enjoys some protection
against [a] rival's entry or expansion that would erode such supracompetitive prices and
profits.'" (quoting 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAIP ET A .. , supra note 16, 501)).
49. FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, § 1.11. This section
states:
In attempting to determine objectively the effect of a "small but significant and
nontransitory" increase in price, the Agency, in most contexts, will use a price
increase of five percent lasting for the foreseeable future. However, what consti-
tutes a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price will depend on
the nature of the industry, and the Agency at times may use a price increase that
is larger or smaller than five percent.
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conclude that (1) monopoly power is being exercised and (2) the ob-
served market flowing from the restraint effects are
"anticompetitive." 50
By colluding with its competitors to raise or stabilize prices, for
example, by agreeing to refrain from competitive actions designed to
capture customers, or by excluding competition by unilaterally creat-
ing obstacles for actual or potential competitors, a firm can create or
maintain market power and cause anticompetitive effects. Market
power may also flow from conditions in the marketplace, such as
product differentiation, the existence of intellectual property rights,
or other factors that insulate a seller's product from competition.51
For instance, it is well recognized that one purpose of patents is to
encourage investment in innovative activities by giving patent holders
protection from competition over products and processes, which
thereby can enable them to earn supracompetitive returns on those
products and procefes.52 As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
"The patent laws 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts' by
rewarding innovation with a temporary monopoly."5 3
Monopoly power and anticompetitive effects can also flow from
the unlawful or improper extension of a legal period of market exclu-
sivity. Such an unlawful extension is what triggers potential Sherman
Act liability in delayed generic entry cases. The court in one such case
recently recognized that, in the pharmaceutical industry context, hav-
ing a patent on a particular active ingredient can provide a seller with
monopoly power, dissipated only by the expiration of the intellectual
property protection of FDA granted exclusivity. 54 Therefore, "if a pat-
50. Re/Max Int'l, Inc., v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1018-19 (6th Cir. 1999).
51. Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 438 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997)
("[M] arket power exists in three circumstances: where the government has granted a seller
a patent or similar monopoly, where the seller possesses a unique product, or where the
seller possesses a high market share.") (citing Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 833
F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1987)); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 77 F. Supp.
2d 189, 196 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding monopoly power may be created where patents and
regulatory hurdles pose barrier to entry of potential competitors).
52. 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, 1780a.
53. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 730
(2002).
54. In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (D.NJ. 2004) ("Although
a patent holder lawfully acquires a monopoly power via the patent process, it subsequently
may violate the second prong of the Grinnell test by unlawfully maintaining that monopoly
power."); see, e.g., Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 814 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (discussing ways in which delayed generic entry arrangement "can manipulate the
statutory grant of a monopoly" and Hatch-Waxman Act provisions "bar competitive en-
tries" and illegally extend market power); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51
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ent holder's actions unlawfully maintain otherwise lawful monopoly
power ... such actions could lead to anticompetitive effects in the
relevant market [violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act].55
C. Assessing Monopoly Power and Anticompetitive Effects: The
Direct and Indirect Methods
Under antitrust analysis, "[in] arket power can be shown through
two types of proof."56 First, its exercise can be assessed directly from
existing or past market conditions by examining whether the restraint
of trade in question yielded prices that were significantly elevated over
competitive levels. 57 This can be as straightforward as examining
whether lifting the alleged anticompetitive restraint (i.e., allowing
generics to enter the market) actually led to lower prices or increased
output. It might also involve permitting a firm to charge prices sub-
stantially in excess of its marginal costs. 58 Given that direct evidence of
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (considering patents and regulatory barriers to entry in context of market
power); Hewlett-Packard Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (finding allegations of barriers to entry,
including patents and regulatory hurdles, sufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
55. In re Remeron, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
56. See, e.g., Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999)
("There are two ways to establish ... that a defendant holds market power. The first is by
presenting direct evidence showing the exercise of actual control over prices. . . .The
second is by presenting circumstantial evidence... by showing a high market share within
a defined market."); see also Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97-98 (2d
Cir. 1998) ("[Market power] may be proven directly by evidence of the control of prices
... or it may be inferred from one firm's large percentage share of the relevant market.");
Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 196-97 (1st
Cir. 1996).
57. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51 ("Where evidence indicates that a firm has
in fact profitably [raised prices substantially above the competitive level], the existence of
monopoly power is clear."); see also Re/Max, 173 F.3d at 1016 (stating plaintiff can prove
monopoly power by proving "actual control over prices or actual exclusion of competi-
tors"); Coastal Fuels Inc., 79 F.3d at 196 (direct evidence of market power can be shown
through "actual supracompetitive prices and restricted output"); Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Ad.
Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.1995) ("If the plaintiff puts forth evidence of
restricted output and supracompetitive prices, that is direct proof of the injury to competi-
tion which a competitor with market power may inflict, and thus, of the actual exercise of
market power.").
58. In the absence of benchmarks reflecting the competitive price level that can be
readily developed from actual market experience, such as the price that prevails upon
generic entry, economists derive benchmarks from the economic theory that applies in
competitive markets. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, SECOND EDITION, supra note 39, at 57.
Economists use the term "perfect competition" to describe a market structure where mar-
ket outcomes are unaffected by the exercise of market power. Id. In a perfectly competitive
market outcome, prices will reflect marginal cost, i.e., the added cost associated with pro-
ducing and selling the last (or incremental) unit of output. While a perfectly competitive
market represents an idealistic economic model, economists use divergence of price levels
from marginal costs as indicia of the existence (and exercise) of market power. See FTC v.
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the present or past exercise of market power, i.e., establishing market
prices substantially above competitive levels, is direct evidence of an-
ticompetitive effects and vice versa, the proof requirements for mo-
nopoly power under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and
anticompetitive effects under Section 1 should mirror one another
when employing the direct method. 59
Because direct evidence of the exercise of monopoly power is
often unavailable or ambiguous for the particular market or industry
in question,60 the more familiar approach to proof of market power is
the indirect method, which focuses on circumstantial evidence of the pos-
sibility that a particular restraint of trade could create or enhance
market power. The indirect method involves a two step process. First,
an appropriate "relevant product market" (or simply "relevant mar-
ket")61 must be defined. Under the modern view, as exemplified by
the merger guidelines published by the FTC and the U.S. Department
of Justice, a relevant market is the smallest group of products such
that a firm that controlled the output for those products could profita-
bly raise or maintain prices substantially above competitive levels for a
non-transitory period of time.62 As will be discussed further in the
Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (invalidating an agreement because it
permitted dentists to charge above a "price approximating the marginal cost of providing
them"); Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(holding ability to maintain price above competitive levels is "powerful evidence of actual
monopolization"); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1241, 1250
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (chargingjury that "'a relevant market is the smallest grouping of sales...
that a firm with 100% of that grouping could profitably reduce output and increase price
substantially above marginal cost"' (internal citation omitted)), affJd in part and rev'd in
part, 129 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997), vacated and substituted, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
While marginal cost as a theoretical concept is not always readily measurable, other mea-
sures of cost such as average variable cost and operating cost often serve as reasonable
proxies. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, Why Are Prices Sticky? Preliminary Results From an Interview
Study, 81 Am. ECON. REv. 89, 95-96 (1991); MICHAEL OLIVE, Is AVERAGE VARIABLE COST A
GOOD PROXY FOR SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? 1-2 & 17 (Aug.
2002), available at http://www.econ.mq.edu.au/research/2002/8200201ive.pdf (last ac-
cessed Sept. 20, 2004).
59. See, e.g., Re/Max, 173 F.3d at 1019 (applying direct evidence analysis from Section
1 cases, and stating that "we see no reason to believe that monopoly power in the Sec. 1
context is any different from the Sec. 2 monopoly power").
60. See generally 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, 531a ("Because they sel-
dom have such data, antitrust courts traditionally define a market and examine the firms'
market shares.").
61. Id.
62. A market is defined as:
[A] product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is produced
or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regu-
lation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of those products
in that area likely would impose at least a "small but significant and non-transi-
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next section of this Article, relevant market analysis with circumstan-
tial proof involves an evaluation of whether products are "reasonably
interchangeable." Only those products that are both functionally simi-
lar and economically substitutable belong in the same relevant
market.63
Second, a showing must be made that the incumbent firm has a
dominant share of the sales in that market.64 If such dominance can
be demonstrated, an inference may be drawn that the dominant firm
possesses monopoly power, the exercise of which results in anticompe-
titive effects. 65 The basis for this sort of inference is the large body of
economic literature linking market structure-most importantly, mar-
ket share-and market power. 66
The foundation of the indirect method of assessing monopoly
power, and anticompetitive effects, is the notion that the existence of
one or more close economic substitutes for a product will constrain
the ability of the firm selling that product to raise or maintain prices
above the competitive level.67 Under the indirect approach, the prin-
cipal issue is always the constraining capabilities of existing competi-
tors to prevent an incumbent firm from charging prices above
competitive levels.68 Where an incumbent product faces close eco-
nomic substitutes, those substitutes will force the prices to or near
competitive levels. Those substitutes, then, belong in an appropriately
defined relevant market. Where existing products do not force the
incumbent's prices to or near competitive levels (e.g., levels that pre-
vail only upon the lifting of the restraint of trade in question), those
products do not belong in the relevant market.
tory" increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other products are held
constant.
FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 3, § 1.0. Again, under the FTC/
DOJ guidelines, that threshold is taken to be five percent for one year. Id. § 1.11.
63. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
64. Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1569 (11th Cir. 1983).
65. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 422 (3d ed. 1990); W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTI-
TRUST 143-50 (3d ed. 2000).
66. See Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, HAND-
BOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 966-67, 973-77 (1989).
67. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 57 ("Structural market power analyses are meant to
determine whether potential substitutes constrain a firm's ability to raise prices above the
competitive level . . ").
68. 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, 1 533, 536.
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D. Direct Evidence of the Exercise of Monopoly Power Is
Superior to Indirect Evidence
In most antitrust cases, detailed pricing and cost data reflecting
the marketplace with and without the alleged competitive restraint is
unavailable, unusable, or ambiguous. This circumstance often exists
because the alleged anticompetitive conduct is continuing and there
is no "after" market to use for comparison purposes. In others, the
pertinent issue may be the potential for certain conduct to have an-
ticompetitive effects or to create or maintain monopoly power. In
such circumstances, economists must revert to inferential (indirect)
means for assessing the likely market power effects. 69
Where direct proof is available, however, litigants are increasingly
permitted in both Section 1 and Section 2 cases to employ the direct
methodology, not merely in addition to, but in lieu of pursuing the
indirect approach. 70 The Supreme Court has held in a Section 1 case,
and other courts have followed in both Section 1 and Section 2 con-
69. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51-56; Rebel Oil Co. v. Ad. Richfield Co., 51
F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
70. Andrew I. Gavil, Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing Gap Between Sections 1 And 2 of the
Sherman Act, 68 ANTITRUST L.J., 87, 101 (2000); see also FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (direct proof of actual anticompetitive effects sufficient in a Sec-
tion 1 case); Conwood Co., L.P. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 n.2 (6th
Cir. 2002) ("Whether a company has monopoly or market power 'may be proven directly
by evidence of the control of prices or the exclusion of competition .... ' (citation omit-
ted)); Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51 (stating that in a Section 2 case, if "evidence indicates
that a firm has in fact [profitably raised prices substantially above the competitive level],
the existence of monopoly power is clear"); Toys "R" Us, Inc., v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937
(7th Cir. 2000) (finding that market power in a Section 1 case may be shown directly with
proof of anticompetitive effects); Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc. 173 F.3d 995, 1018
(6th Cir. 1999) (market power in Section 2 case can be established "when there is direct
evidence that the defendant has actually set prices or excluded competition"); Tops Mkts.,
Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1998) (monopoly power in a Section
2 case "may be proven directly by evidence of the control of prices or the exclusion of
competition, or it may be inferred from one firm's large percentage share of the relevant
market"); Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182,
196-97 (1st Cir. 1996) (Section 2 case); Rebel Oil Co., 51 F.3d at 1434. In a Section 2 case,
Market power may be demonstrated through either of two types of proof. One
type of proof is direct evidence of the injurious exercise of market power. If the
plaintiff puts forth evidence of restricted output and supracompetitive prices, that
is direct proof of the injury to competition which a competitor with market power
may inflict, and thus, of the actual exercise of market power.
Id. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit states:
Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to
determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects
on competition, "proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of out-
put," can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a "surro-
gate for detrimental effects."
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texts, that formally defining a relevant market and assessing whether
the incumbent firm has a dominant share of that market are unneces-
sary in cases where direct proof of monopoly power and anticompeti-
tive effects is available. 7 '
This is because indirect monopoly power analysis is merely a sur-
rogate for proving monopoly power and anticompetitive effects when
direct evidence is not available or is ambiguous.7 2 If monopoly power
may be shown directly, there is no need to define a relevant market as
part of an indirect method of assessing the existence of something
that can be demonstrated directly.73 This is true regardless of whether
the action has been brought under Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act.74 Indeed, if direct proof exists then a direct assessment of
monopoly power is not only the preferred methodology, but in such a
Flegel v. Christian Hospital Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 1993) (citations omit-
ted); see also Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 874 F.2d 1417, 1437 (lth Cir. 1989) (in
Section 1 case, "plaintiffs can show actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output
or increased price, instead of an inquiry into market power"), rev'd on other grounds, 498
U.S. 46 (1990).
71. See infra note 73 and cases cited therein.
72. See 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, 515.
73. See FRC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 406 U.S. at 460-61; Todd v. Exxon Corp, 275
F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2001) ("If a plaintiff can show that a defendant's conduct exerted an
actual adverse effect on competition, this is a strong indicator of market power. In fact, this
arguably is more direct evidence of market power than calculations of elusive market share
figures." (citation omitted)); Toys "R" Us, 221 F.3d at 937 ("[T]he share a firm has in a
properly defined relevant market is only a way of estimating market power, which is the
ultimate consideration."); Re/Max, 173 F.3d at 1018 ("[A]n antitrust plaintiff is not re-
quired to rely on indirect evidence of a defendant's monopoly power ... when there is
direct evidence that the defendant has actually set prices or excluded competition.");
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51 ("Where evidence indicates that a firm has in fact profitably
[raised prices above the competitive level], the existence of monopoly power is clear.");
Am. Floral Servs., Inc. v. Florists' Transworld Delivery Ass'n, 633 F. Supp. 201, 221-22
(N.D. Ill. 1986) ("After all, market share is at best a proxy for market power, and a rough
one at that. What really counts is the ability of a producer to control output and obtain
supracompetitive prices." (citing Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. ot Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984))); 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, 531a ("Find-
ing the relevant market and its structure is not a goal in itself but a surrogate for market
power."); id. 515 (resorting to "market-definition approach" is warranted when "no other
observable facts establish the existence and degree of market power more directly").
74. For decisions under Section 1 of the Sherman Act approving of the use of direct
proof of monopoly power in place of circumstantial evidence of dominant share of a rele-
vant market, see, for example, Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61; Todd, 275
F.3d at 206; Toys "R" Us, 221 F.3d at 937; and In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC
LEXIS 187 (Dec. 8, 2003). For decisions under Section 2 of the Sherman Act approving of
the use of direct proof of monopoly power in place of circumstantial evidence of dominant
share of a relevant market, see, for example, Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51; Re/Max, 173
F.3d at 1016; Tops Markets, 142 F.3d at 97-98; Coastal Fuels, 79 F.3d at 196; and Rebel Oil Co,
51 F.3d at 1434.
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case the indirect method may amount to little more than an inappro-
priate and wasteful diversion.
The pertinent inquiry is whether a defendant's conduct has per-
mitted (or would permit) it to profitably raise or maintain prices
above competitive levels. If one can prove that directly-for instance,
by showing with direct evidence that after the restraint of trade in
question has lifted the price dropped substantially, what possible legit-
imate purpose would be served by requiring indirect proof of that same
point? Indeed, direct evidence of market prices materially exceeding
competitive levels for a substantial period of time is evidence that the
restraint in question misallocates resources in an economic sense, has
reduced consumer welfare, and thus yielded anticompetitive effects.
75
From a public policy perspective, the promotion of consumer welfare
is a well-accepted goal of the federal antitrust laws-including both
Sections 1 and 2.76 As one commentator has written:
75. Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding acts
that harm allocative efficiency and raise the price of goods above the competitive level
harm consumer welfare); Rebel Oil Co., 51 F.3d at 1433 (stating conduct harms consumer
welfare "when it harms both allocative efficiency and raises the prices of goods above com-
petitive levels or diminishes their quality"); Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum
Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 293 (5th Cir. 1988) ("driv[ing] up prices ... reduce[s] consumer
welfare"); Storer Cable Communications, Inc. v. City of Montgomery, 826 F. Supp. 1338,
1352 (M.D. Ala. 1993) ("eliminat[ing] or significantly diminish[ing] an important source
of competitive pressure on price" has "a substantial adverse effect on consumer welfare");
Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 352
(M.D.N.C. 1990) ("Injury to competition occurs only if a competitor is able to raise and
maintain prices in the relevant market above competitive levels because this is the only
situation where consumer welfare is threatened."). The Eleventh Circuit court states that
[t] he purpose of the Sherman Act is... to protect the public from the failure of
the market. The law directs itself ... against conduct which unfairly tends to
destroy competition itself. It does so not out of solicitude for private concerns but
out of concern for the public interest.
Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, 376 F.3d 1065, 1069
(l1th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). See also K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg.
Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129, (2d Cir. 1995) (equating "competitive pressure on price" with "con-
sumer welfare").
76. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221
(1993) (acknowledging "antitrust laws' traditional concern for consumer welfare and price
competition"); Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 107 ("'Congress designed the Sherman
Act as a "consumer welfare prescription." A restraint that has the effect of reducing the
importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent with this
fundamental goal of antitrust law.'" (citation omitted)); Major League Baseball v. Crist,
331 F.3d 1177, 1186 (1lth Cir. 2003) ("[T]he antitrust laws form the bedrock of our capi-
talist system premised upon competition, and . . . anticompetitive conduct harms con-
sumer welfare."); Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("Antitrust law is about consumers' welfare and the efficient organization of
production."); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir.
1986) ("[T]he purpose of the antitrust laws is the promotion of consumer welfare.");
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Today, a consensus is emerging that... antitrust should be viewed
as "a consumer welfare prescription." Under this interpretation a
practice constrains trade, monopolizes, is unfair, or tends to lessen
competition if it harms consumers by reducing the value or welfare
they would have obtained from the market-place absent the
practice. 77
Thus, whether the claim is brought under Section 1 or Section 2
of the Sherman Act, determining whether a company has obtained or
is maintaining monopoly power is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a
means of determining whether the firm's conduct-unilateral or con-
certed-is likely to, or has in fact, resulted in artificially inflated exces-
sive prices (or reduced output). In other words, if the purpose of
federal antitrust laws is to punish and deter conduct that is likely to, or
does in fact, harm consumer welfare through supracompetitive pric-
ing, then logically, direct proof that conduct is likely to, or does, harm
consumer welfare through supracompetitive pricing is not only suffi-
cient, but superior to indirect proof. At best, indirect proof could
merely show inferentially what is already known directly.
Again, relevant market analysis provides merely an indirect, cir-
cumstantial way of demonstrating monopoly power and the ability of
challenged conduct to have anticompetitive effects. Accordingly,
courts increasingly, and correctly, recognize that where direct evi-
dence of "actual supracompetitive prices and restricted output"-that
is, actual anticompetitive effects-is available, there is no need to de-
fine a "relevant market." 78
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("'[T] he purpose of the antitrust laws [is] the promotion of consumer welfare."' (citation
omitted)).
77. Krattenmaker et al., supra note 46, at 244.
78. Coastal Fuels, 79 F.3d at 196-97; see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d
101, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2002) (relevant market must be shown only "[i]n the absence of
direct measurements of a defendant's ability to control prices or exclude competition"). A
Sixth Circuit case states:
[W]e find that although the plaintiffs failed to define the relevant market with
precision and therefore failed to establish the defendants' monopoly power
through circumstantial evidence, there does exist a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the plaintiffs' evidence shows direct evidence of a monopoly, that is,
actual control over prices or actual exclusion of competitors.
Re/Max, 173 F.3d at 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Cf Conceptual Eng'g Ass'n, Inc. v. Elec. Bond-
ing, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262, 1268 (D.R.I. 1989) ("The purpose of market definitions is not
to frustrate antitrust plaintiffs by requiring the proof of bright lines which do not exist, but
is to help identify monopoly power, that is, 'the power to control prices or exclude compe-
tition."' (citing Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274, 280
(1st Cir. 1982))), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983).
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In sum, where direct evidence of the exercise of monopoly power
and anticompetitive effects is available, it is the preferred mode of analy-
sis because, in such circumstances, using relevant market analysis can
obscure rather than elucidate competitive concerns.79 As one com-
mentator recently observed:
[I]f a firm or firms successfully engage in either collusionary or
exclusionary conduct, the law presumes that it has or they have
market power. Their success would be otherwise inexplicable. In
that case, evidence of low market share is viewed as irrelevant at
best, and at worst as a demonstrably unreliable index of that
power. The burden then shifts to the defendant to defeat the evi-
dence of market power-and to do so it must challenge the direct
evidence; it cannot simply rely on contrary, circumstantial evidence
in the form of low market shares.80
E. In Delayed Generic Entry Cases, Monopoly Power and
Anticompetitive Effects Can Be Established Solely with
the Direct Method
In delayed generic entry cases there is an abundance of direct
evidence showing that the challenged conduct has clear and substan-
tial anticompetitive effects. As a result, there is no need to require an
analysis of monopoly power or anticompetitive effects by the indirect
method. Indeed, defining a relevant market with circumstantial proof
in this context is not only unnecessary, it is likely wasteful, diversion-
ary, and confusing.
While, at best, the indirect method can confirm what is already
known from examination of the direct evidence, at worst, it can con-
fuse and obscure the competitive issues involved. 81 It is useful here to
79. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Allen-
Myland v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir. 1994) ("'Market share [in a
relevant market] is just a way of estimating market power, which is the ultimate considera-
tion. When there are better ways to estimate market power the court should use them.'"
(citation omitted)); Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 202 (3d Cir. 1992)
("'proof of actual detrimental effects'" is proof, standing alone, of monopoly power (cita-
tion omitted)); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570-71 (11th
Cir. 1983) (describing market share as but a "surrogate for market power"); 2A AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, 531a ("Finding the relevant market and its structure is
not a goal in itself but a surrogate for market power.").
80. Gavil, supra note 70, at 99. Gavil states, "It is hard to see why circumstantial evi-
dence in the form of market share should ever be sufficient to rebut a showing of market
power based on direct evidence or reduced output and higher prices." Id. at 109.
81. Interestingly, while one industry defender argues that relevant market is "an es-
sential element of any claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization under sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act," M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 633, 653 (2003) (emphasis added), the authority he cites for the
proposition does not support his sweeping generalization. For instance, he quotes from
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analogize to a murder case, in which two types of proof are potentially
available: (1) direct evidence, including a signed confession and a
videotape of the crime; and (2) indirect evidence such as facts indicat-
ing that the defendant had the opportunity and motive to kill the vic-
tim. In the typical delayed generic entry case, the plaintiff has the
equivalent of the signed confession and videotape of the crime-
namely the undisputed direct evidence that generic entry brings down
prices and delaying that entry results in the maintenance of prices
above the post-entry levels. That is to say, there is no material dispute
in any of these cases about whether, by gaming the system to delay
generic entry, purchasers are forced to pay more for drugs. Only
through possession of monopoly power would it be possible for the
branded company to charge prices, typically two to ten times more than
those that were available following the entry of generic competition.
Thus, direct evidence of anticompetitive effects is evidence of mainte-
nance of monopoly power, and vice versa.
Why, then, would it be necessary to go through the circumstantial
method of proving that a firm had market power sufficient to cause
certain anticompetitive effects when those very effects are not in dis-
pute? Returning to the murder case analogy, requiring indirect analy-
sis of market power in delayed generic entry cases is akin to
mandating circumstantial evidence of a time-line showing that the de-
fendant had the opportunity to kill the victim in a case where the
signed confession and videotape evidence are not in material dispute.
Where the uncontested direct evidence shows that the defendant
stabbed the victim to death, no material fact turns on the resolution of
a hypothetical debate about whether the defendant had a plausible
motive or alibi.
It is for this reason that the proper response to an indirect market
power analysis purporting to show that a firm (or firms) did not main-
tain monopoly power by delaying generic entry, and thus could not
have maintained higher prices through the challenged conduct,
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machine & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965), in
which the Supreme Court stated that "[w]ithout a definition of [the] market there is no
way to measure [a defendant's] ability to lessen or destroy competition." Note that the
language quoted implicitly assumes that the parties do not already know whether the de-
fendant had indeed "lessen[ed] or destroyfed] competition." Of course, the context in
delayed generic entry cases is that we already know through direct evidence that by delaying
generic entry, competition was diminished (destroyed), and prices were inflated. Accord-
ingly, since the point of the exercise is to determine whether the defendant "had the ability
to lessen or destroy competition," and it is known that through direct evidence that such
was the case, the relevant market exercise is superfluous in these cases.
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would be to question the methods by which the circumstantial analysis
was done (or the data that was used). It would not be an occasion to
ignore what all parties know before the indirect analysis begins,
namely, that generic entry brings down prices and, as a result, in-
creases consumer welfare. Moreover, dismissing a delayed generic en-
try case for failure to define a relevant market using circumstantial
evidence would be just as illogical as requiring the dismissal of the
hypothetical stabbing case, despite the videotape and uncontested
signed confession, because circumstantial evidence showing that the
defendant had a motive to kill the victim was not produced or was
unclear.
The simple fact is that the competitive effects of generic entry,
and therefore, of delaying generic entry, is not typically in material
dispute in these cases. Generic entry almost always yields substantially
lower prices for the vast majority of purchasers of the drug molecule
at issue.82 The matter of fact conclusion of the court in Valley Drug Co.
v. Geneva Pharmacies, Inc. 3-a delayed generic entry case-bears re-
peating here: "the anticompetitive effects [of delaying generic entry]
cannot be seriously debated."84 Given that the anticompetitive effects
flow, by definition, from the exercise of market power, this means that
the maintenance of market power also, in the words of the Eleventh
Circuit, "cannot be seriously debated. '8 5
There are numerous academic and government studies of the ef-
fects of generic entry and thus of the competitive effects that flow
from its delay.8 6 This literature reveals a consistent pattern. Initial ge-
82. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
83. 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
84. Id. at 1311 n.27. The District Court of Massachusetts states:
A generic drug typically enters the market at a price substantially below that of a
branded drug. For this reason, the generic drug quickly captures a large market
share. As other generic versions enter the market, prices of the generic drugs
drop further, leading to a corresponding increase in their market share. To com-
pensate, the manufacturer of the branded drug frequently increases its level of
discounts and other price adjustments.
In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 337, 344 (D. Mass. 2003).
85. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1311 n.27.
86. See, e.g., Duane M. Kirking, et al., Economics and Structure of the Generic Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry, 41 J. Am. PHARMACY AsS'N 578-84 (2001); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How IN-
CREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 23 (1998), available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/6xx/doc655/
pharm.pdf (last accessed Oct. 25, 2004); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS, AND REwARDs (1993), available at http://www.wws.
princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/-ota.disk/1993/9336/93 3 6 .pdf (last accessed Aug. 28,
2004); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE PEDIATRIC EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION: JANUARY 2001
STATUS REPORT TO CONGRESS (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/re
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neric entry occurs at prices substantially below the pre-entry price of
the brand. 7 Brand customers quickly respond by shifting purchases to
the generic product; indeed, seventy percent of the market typically
shifts from the brand to the generic within the first several weeks.88
Subsequently, once the generic exclusivity often granted to the
first generic entrant lapses, 9 additional generic firms enter the mar-
ket and the process accelerates.90 The generic sellers compete with
each other on price, rapidly driving prices down toward short-run pro-
duction and selling costs.91 Nearly all of the sales formerly enjoyed by
the brand shift to generic sellers. 92 Once this process is completed,
prices paid for the drug molecule-brand plus generic sales com-
bined-are substantially less, often more than eighty-percent less,
portcong0l.pdf (last accessed Sept. 20, 2004); Jay P. Bae, Drug Patent Expirations and the
Speed of Generic Entry, 32 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 87-101 (1997); Richard E. Caves et al.,
Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 1991
MICROECONOMICS (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity) 1-66 (1991); Richard G. Frank
& David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricingfor Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 75-90 (1997) [hereinafter Frank & Salkever, Generic Entry]; Richard G. Frank &
David S. Salkever, Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market for Pharmaceuticals, 59 S. ECON. J.
165-79 (1992) [hereinafter Frank & Salkever, Pricing]; Henry Grabowski & John Vernon,
Longer Patent for Increased Generic Competition in the U.S. The Waxman-Hatch Act After One Dec-
ade, 10 PHtARMAcoEcONOMICS, 110, 110-23 (Supp. No. 2, 1996) [hereinafter Grabowski &
Vernon, Longer Patent]; Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35J.L. & ECON. 331-50 (1992) [here-
inafter Grabowski & Vernon, Brand Loyalty]; Richard P. Rozek & Ruth Berkowitz, The Costs
to the U.S. Health Care System of Extending Marketing Exclusivity to Taxol7, 9 J. REs. PHARMACY.
ECON. 21-41 (1999); Dong-Churl Sub et al., Effect of Multiple-Source Entry on Price Competition
After Patent Expiration in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 35 HEALTH SERV. RES., 529, 529-47
(2000); David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. &
STAT. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 35), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpa
pers/industrydynamicsreiffenwp.pdf (last accessed Sept. 20, 2004); DONG-CHURL SUH, EF-
FECT OF MULTIPLE SOURCE ENTRY ON PRICE COMPETITION AFTER PATENT EXPIRATION IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1993) (doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file
with authors).
87. See Grabowski & Vernon, Brand Loyalty, supra note 86, at 335 (noting the "general
pattern is that generic products enter at a significant discount to the pioneering product");
Caves et al., supra note 86 at 35-36; Frank & Salkever, Genetic Entry, supra note 86, at 83-84;
Reiffen & Ward, supra note 86, at 1, 22-24.
88. DOUG LONG, 2003 YEAR IN REVIEW: TRENDS, ISSUES, FORECASTS 34 (IMS 2004) (on
file with authors).
89. The Hatch-Waxman Act grants 180 days of marketing exclusivity to the first appli-
cant to file a substantially-complete ANDA that successfully challenges an invalid, improp-
erly listed, or noninfringed patent. See Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d 1322,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
90. See Caves et al., supra note 86, at 35-36.
91. See Reiffen & Ward, supra note 86, at 1, 35-36.
92. Generic penetration now typically exceeds seventy-five percent (reaching as much
as ninety percent) after just two months. LONG, supra note 88, at 34.
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than the price the brand had enjoyed prior to generic entry.93 In
short, generic entry allows purchasers to buy the same product at a
substantially reduced cost, greatly enhancing consumer welfare with
reference to widely-used pharmaceuticals. 94
Generic entry, then, is a textbook case of procompetitive price
competition.95 Recently, in the first full consideration on the merits of
these questions in a delayed generic entry case, In the Matter of Schering-
Plough Corp.,96 the FTC Commission came to the same conclusion
based on the evidence that had been presented during trial. Analyzed
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Schering concerned agreements
between Schering-Plough, the manufacturer of the brand-name drug
K-Dur 20, and two generic manufacturers, Upsher-Smith and Ameri-
can Home Products, in which Schering settled Hatch-Waxman patent
litigation with the generic manufacturers by agreeing to pay them not
to enter the market with generic versions of Schering's brand-name
drug.97 Noting that the generic entered the market at half the price of
the brand,98 the FTC explicitly recognized the "uniquely significant"
impact of generic entry:
[T] here is credible evidence in the record... which indicates that
generic entry was a uniquely significant market event, and recog-
nized as such by both parties. Their predictions about the likely
effects of generic entry, which were consistent with historic experi-
ence of other branded drugs, are just as compelling as predictions
93. See Caves et al., supra note 86, at 36; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 32. It
appears that some brand-name manufacturers respond to generic entry by offering in-
creased discounts to certain significant customers that are perceived by manufacturers as
having the ability to influence prescribing behavior, but for the most part, decline to com-
pete on price with generics. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 29-31; In re
Relafen Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 337, 344 (D. Mass. 2003). Given that most customers
substitute less-expensive generics for the brand in either case, it really does not matter
whether brand manufacturers respond by lowering their prices to generic levels or cede
the vast majority of the market. Either way, the same drug is being sold at much lower
prices to most purchasers after generic entry.
94. See Reiffen & Ward, supra note 86, at 23, 35-36 (stating that the premium of price
over cost margins eventually "shrinks and disappears" as multiple generic competitors
enter the market).
95. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at ix (generic drugs "have played an
important role in holding down national spending on prescription drugs from what it
would otherwise have been" and estimating savings between eight and ten billion dollars in
1994 alone); FED. TRADE COMM'N, sup'a note 4, at 9 ("competition from generic drugs can
deliver large savings to consumers").
96. Docket No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187 (Dec. 8, 2003) (final order), appeal filed,
No. 04-10688 (l1th Cir. Feb. 13, 2004).
97. Id. at *15-*19.
98. Id. at *53.
[Vol. 39
based upon market shares. Moreover, these predictions turned out
to be true.
99
In a lengthy and cogent opinion (now on appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit), based upon the same essential facts regarding generic com-
petition present in all of the delayed generic entry cases, the Commis-
sion reversed the decision of an administrative law judge who had
required proof of a relevant market and defined the market in terms
of therapeutic category.1 00 The Commission concluded that "it is not
necessary to rely on indirect proof that Schering has a monopoly
share in a relevant market when the competitive effects of the 're-
straint' can be shown directly."10 1 As the FTC continued:
We conclude that the Initial Decision's approach-which defines a
relevant market, calculates shares, and then draws inferences from
these shares and from other industry characteristics-is not the
most appropriate way to proceed in cases like this one where more
direct evidence of competitive effects is available.
10 2
In reversing what the FFC described as the Administrative LawJudge's
"error" in requiring indirect proof of market power and anticompeti-
tive effects, the FTC reminded antitrust practitioners that
some in the antitrust community have become so accustomed to
the traditional way of proceeding that they forget that this complex
market analysis provides only an indirect indication that trade has
been or may be restrained. It is not necessary to weigh all of these
[relevant market related] factors if a case presents more direct evi-
dence of actual or likely competitive effects.'
0 3
The FrC's Schering decision builds upon the FTC's victory nearly
two decades earlier in the Supreme Court in another case, Federal
Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.'0 4 In Indiana Federa-
tion of Dentists, the Supreme Court held that "the finding of actual,
sustained adverse effects on competition .. . is legally sufficient to
support a finding that the challenged restraint was unreasonable even
in the absence of elaborate market analysis.'
10 5
In Schering, the FTC adopted a direct assessment of anticompeti-
tive effects over the indirect relevant market approach under Section
1 of the Sherman Act. In our view, where direct evidence that the
restraint of trade in question substantially inflated prices is available,
99. Id. at *46 (holding that agreements between pharmaceutical manufacturers not to
compete can constitute violations of the Sherman Act).
100. Id.
101. Id. at *39 (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists 476 US 447, 460 (1986)).
102. Id. at *23.
103. Id. at *41 n.32 (emphasis added).
104. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
105. Id. at 461.
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there should be no analytical distinction between using actual an-
ticompetitive effects for assessing an unreasonable restraint of trade
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and assessing monopoly power
under Section 2. To the extent that courts and commentators have,
however, distinguished between assessing market power under these
two Sherman Act sections, it has been to note that a Section 2 analysis
might require showing a higher degree of market power. 10 6 In
delayed generic entry cases, however, it is both unambiguous and
clear that delaying generic entry permits maintenance of prices at least
double the competitive level. That amount of artificial price inflation
is substantial by any measure. 10 7
Moreover, given that, as explained above, both sections of the
Sherman Act discussed here are, at root, concerned with enhancing
consumer welfare-i.e., preventing anticompetitive effects in the form
of supracompetitive prices or reduced output-the presence of direct
evidence that delaying generic entry harms consumer welfare through
the exercise of monopoly power obviates the need to pursue the indi-
rect approach. Requiring a relevant market analysis using circumstan-
tial evidence would simply increase the likelihood of misinterpreting
the results and of getting the wrong answer.
F. In Delayed Generic Entry Cases, the Direct Evidence
Necessarily Implies a Relevant Market Limited
to the Molecule
As discussed above, given the availability of direct evidence of the
anticompetitive effects of delaying generic entry, there is no need to
define a relevant market in any of these cases. It is nevertheless note-
106. Many courts use the terms "market power" and "monopoly power" interchangea-
bly. See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 367, 374 n.22 (E.D. Pa.
1994) ("'Market power' is a synonym for 'monopoly power."' (citation omitted)), affid, 51
F.3d 1191 (3d Cir. 1995). Economists also use the two terms interchangeably. See e.g., DEN-
NIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 92 (3d ed.
2000) [hereinafter CARLTON & PERLOFF, THIRD EDITION] ("The terms monopoly power and
market power typically are used interchangeably to mean the ability to profitably set price
above competitive levels."). Other courts use "monopoly power" to mean "substantial mar-
ket power." See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 966
(10th Cir. 1990); Carpet Group Int'l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass'n, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 249,
286-87 & n.32 (D.N.J. 2003). "Substantial market power" exists where a firm can maintain
price substantially above the competitive level without a significant loss of sales due to
consumer resistance. See The Package Shop, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 894,
939-40 (D.N.J. 1987).
107. Such pricing far in excess of competitive levels, for instance, greatly exceeds the
five percent materiality benchmark set by the FTC. FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 3, § 1.11.
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worthy that the same direct proof of market power-evidence that by
delaying generic entry a firm can profitably command prices substan-
tially above competitive levels-also constitutes proof that the relevant
market must be limited exclusively to the molecule, namely, the brand
and its generic equivalents.
To return to the murder case analogy, in a case where one has an
uncontested signed confession and videotape of the crime, logic dic-
tates that the outcome of any raging debates about the probity of the
circumstantial proof taken as a whole, such as, whether the fingerprint
evidence from the crime scene matches those of the defendant, must
ultimately confirm what the uncontested direct proof shows. That is to
say, if analyzed correctly, the circumstantial evidence regarding
whether the defendant killed the victim should logically confirm what
the undisputed videotape evidence shows. Moreover, any argument by
the defendant that the circumstantial proof is exculpatory, despite the
videotape and confession, could hardly be taken seriously. Yet, the in-
dustry defenders' position in delayed generic entry cases is not materi-
ally different from that of the hapless murder defendant in this
analogy.
For cases involving delayed generic entry, an appropriately de-
fined relevant market must be the narrowest universe of products,
starting with the molecule itself, which a hypothetical monopolist
would need to control in order to profitably raise the price above
competitive levels. 108 Courts have consistently adopted this "above
competitive level" approach. 10 9 Viewed this way, the direct and indi-
108. Cf id. § 1.0.
A market is defined as a product or group of products and a geographic area in
which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not
subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or
seller of those products in that area likely would impose at least a "small but
significant and nontransitory" increase in price.
Id. The relevant market is "no bigger than necessary to satisfy this test" and may encompass
only a single product. Id. § 1.11.
109. See, e.g., Rebel Oil v. Ad. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.1995) ("A
'market' is any grouping of sales whose sellers, if unified by a monopolist or hypothetical
cartel, would have market power.. .. " (citation omitted)); Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico,
Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 197 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The definition of
relevant market depends upon economic restraints which prevent sellers from raising
prices above competitive levels." (citation omitted)); see also SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The purpose of defining a relevant
market is to assist in determining whether a firm has market power.... [T]he monopolist's
market power consists of having sufficient economic muscle to permit it to raise prices well
in excess of competitive levels without inducing customers to turn elsewhere."); Picker Int'l
Inc. v. Leavitt, 865 F. Supp. 951, 959 (D. Mass. 1994) ("[T]he ultimate question concerning
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rect methods of establishing market power should effectively be indis-
tinguishable when direct evidence is available. By definition, the very
same facts that establish directly that a firm has market power must
mean that the relevant market is the molecule. Put another way, the
smallest set of products that the brand firm must control in order to
set prices at a supracompetitive level is the drug molecule in both its
branded and generic forms. Controlling a smaller market, e.g., the
brand alone, is not enough. Controlling a larger market, namely,
other therapeutic substitutes, is not necessary.
Inasmuch as control over the molecule gives rise to substantial
market power and thereby permits profitable above-competitive level
pricing, it is the market that is relevant to analyzing competitive ef-
fects in delayed generic entry cases. Given that the molecule is the
narrowest set of products, control over which confers substantial mar-
ket power (i.e., a branded company would not need to control any
drug products other than the molecule in order to price the brand at
supracompetitive levels), it must be the relevant market pertinent to
these cases.' 10
It is useful to note in this context that a relevant product market
is always defined in relation to the claims that give rise to the inquiry
in the first place. As the court noted in U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Health-
source, Inc.,"' in defining markets and deciding between direct and
market definition is whether a hypothetical cartel could raise prices significantly above the
competitive level.").
110. Critiquing the FrC for disagreeing with him, one apparent industry defender ar-
gues that the law has an "aversion to single firm [relevant] markets." Morse, supra note 81,
at 666. The reason Mr. Morse gives for his view appears to be little more than that courts
have, at times, rejected markets defined to include a single brand. Yet, first, the relevant
market implied by the facts in delayed generic entry cases is the molecule, i.e., the brand plus
generic equivalents, not one brand by itself. To the extent that there is only one firm mak-
ing and selling the molecule during the period in which generic entry is alleged to have
been improperly delayed, that is because the branded firm has taken steps, which are the
focus of the antitrust challenge, to exclude generic competition. But, the relevant market
is composed of all the actual and potential generic competitors for that drug molecule.
Second, as Mr. Morse himself acknowledges, the Supreme Court has taken a different view.
See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482 (1992) ("[I]n some
instances one brand of a product can constitute a separate product market."); In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 680 (E.D. Mich. 2000) ("[A] single
brand product can constitute a relevant market for antitrust purposes."). Mr. Morse tries to
distinguish Eastman Kodak on the ground that "switching costs limited cross-elasticity" be-
tween products in a broader market. Morse, supra note 81, at 666. Mr. Morse's argument,
thus, reduces to little more than this: when a single brand meets the pertinent criteria, it
can be a relevant market, and when it does not, it cannot. To the extent that that is his
argument, there can be no disagreement.
111. 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
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indirect proof, practitioners must keep in mind "why we are [asking
the question in the first place]: that is, what is the antitrust question in
this case that market definition aims to answer?" 112 In other words,
without the existence of a competitive issue, there is no sensible way to
define a relevant market. Hence, the starting point for an appropriate
relevant market analysis must be the claims in question.
It is this principle that explains the fallacy in the charge that
"[t]he broad range of product market definitions alleged in the vari-
ous cases warrants a closer examination to ensure that the govern-
ment and private plaintiffs are not gerrymandering market definitions
to fit desired outcomes." 113 Market definition is no more than a tool
that is sometimes useful in assessing whether challenged conduct had
or could possibly have (in cases seeking prospective relief, for in-
stance) anticompetitive effects. It makes perfect sense that such an
analytical tool would vary depending upon the conduct being as-
sessed. For instance, if the allegations in a particular case relate to, say,
a merger of two branded manufacturers, the market relevant to ana-
lyzing that claim might legitimately be different than the market rele-
vant to assessing competitive issues in a delayed generic entry case.
There is nothing conceptually wrong with that result. There is no a
priori "relevant market" that relates to all possible claims and circum-
stances in a particular industry.
Control over all drugs in a therapeutic class might allow branded
companies to charge even higher prices than those that prevail pre-
generic entry. This could mean that a case involving a proposed
merger between branded manufacturers of two or more brand-name
drugs in a therapeutic class could imply a relevant market consisting
of various branded manufacturers. But, the mere fact that eliminating
competition between brands might pose competitive issues does not
negate the substantial market power that manufacturers possess over
the molecule prior to generic entry. It also does not and cannot ne-
gate the anticompetitive effects of delaying generic entry, nor the fact
that this direct evidence implies a relevant market that includes only
the brand and its generic equivalents.
In the final analysis, it is simply diversionary to attempt to define
broad relevant markets in cases where it is known that merely by ex-
cluding generics a firm can maintain prices well above levels the firm
could charge if market exclusivity, for whatever reason, came to an
112. Id. at 598.
113. Morse, supra note 81, at 634.
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end. In these cases, there is powerful, indeed overwhelming, direct evi-
dence that generic entry is a competitively significant event-because
it is known that when generics enter, prices drop substantially. There-
fore, arguing about whether "competing" brands discipline prices
somewhat in a therapeutic class pre-generic entry is simply a distrac-
tion from the real competitive issues in delayed generic entry cases.
No discussion of the disciplining effect of "competing" brands can
possibly explain away the undeniable fact that generic entry leads to a
price level far below that which previously prevailed. Industry defend-
ers must instead explain in a straightforward way why it is that generic
entry, and the competitive benefits it brings, should not be considered
pro-competitive-and thus how it is that the effects of delaying entry
are not clearly anticompetitive under the antitrust law-given the
well-recognized substantial price benefits generics afford pharmaceu-
tical purchasers.
Delaying these benefits, and thereby forcing purchasers to over-
pay, constitutes nothing less than the very kind of injury the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent. As the appellate court in one delayed
generic entry case explained with respect to this very question:
"Preventing that kind of injury [i.e., forcing purchasers to buy a
higher priced brand in place of a cheaper generic] was undoubtedly a
raison d'etre of the Sherman Act when it was enacted in 1890."114 That
is to say, merely by delaying generic competition a branded firm
causes antitrust injury. If true, as it clearly is, this must mean that the
challenged conduct yields anticompetitive effects in a relevant market
limited to the molecule.
H. Circumstantial Economic Evidence in Delayed Generic
Entry Cases Confirms that the Relevant Market
is the Molecule
Those who advocate broadly defined relevant markets in delayed
generic entry cases, i.e., markets that would include more than merely
the brand and its generic equivalents, typically suggest that all of the
pharmaceuticals that are indicated for treatment of the same medical
condition-all drugs in the therapeutic class-must be included in
the relevant market.11 5 Industry defenders point to the small share of
114. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 910 (6th Cir. 2003).
115. Morse, supra note 81, at 639-40, 662-63. Cf GregoryJ. Glover, Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, Address Before the Federal Trade Commission and the De-
partment of Justice-Antitrust Division, in FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE-
ANTITRUST DIv., HEARINGS ON COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY
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that broadly defined "market" claimed by the defendant firm's brand-
name product, and presto, "no monopoly power and no anticompeti-
tive effects."
This Section puts aside the fundamental illogic of reaching such
a conclusion in cases where the competitive importance of generic
entry is not seriously disputed. Here, the Article shows that even work-
ing within the confines of typically available circumstantial evidence
relating to market definition, the "therapeutic class as relevant mar-
ket" position in delayed generic entry cases is unsustainable. The Arti-
cle explains that proper application of the indirect evidence in
delayed generic entry cases is fully consistent with, and indeed con-
firms, the direct evidence. This is so largely because of certain idiosyn-
cratic and unique institutional features of the pharmaceutical
industry, which taken as a whole, begin to explain what at first glance
may seem counterintuitive: that the presence of multiple prescription
pharmaceuticals in a therapeutic class does not typically diminish the
substantial market power branded manufacturers have to price their
products well above competitive levels before generic entry.
Accordingly, Section (A) describes certain institutional features
of the pharmaceutical industry, (B) demonstrates how these aspects of
the business create the competitive conditions in which generics end
up playing such a significant economic role, and (C) shows how under
the traditional indirect method of market definition, these institu-
tional features, and the competitive conditions they create, confirm
what is already known, namely, that different drugs within a therapeu-
tic category are unlikely to be "reasonably interchangeable" as the law
defines that term, and thus the relevant market in delayed generic
entry cases is limited to the molecule.
A. Institutional Features of the Pharmaceutical Industry Diminish
Price Competition Between Drugs in the Same
Therapeutic Class and Enhance the Significance
of Generic Competition
The complexity and uniqueness of the United States prescription
pharmaceutical business-and the role of generic competition within
it-flows in large part from the manner in which the industry is regu-
lated. The Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), the FDA, the
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), and state generic-substitution
IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY 6-7, 639-40, 662-63 (March 19, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020319gregoryjglover.pdf (last accessed Dec. 3, 2004).
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laws1 16 all play a role in shaping salient institutional features of the
industry. The interplay of these regulatory bodies, and the legal
framework within which they operate, helps explain why generic com-
petition has such important price reducing effects despite the
proliferation of multiple drugs treating the same condition or disease.
1. The Role of Physicians
One of the key features of the prescription drug industry perti-
nent to this discussion is familiar to anyone who has visited a physician
or taken a prescription drug in this country-consumers do not make
independent decisions about the prescription drugs they consume. In-
stead, consumers must obtain prescriptions from licensed practition-
ers. 117 As one study explains, "Prescription drug purchases are
economically unique because they are a 'directed' demand. Physicians
direct the purchase through drug selection and determination of ap-
propriateness, with minimal input from the consumer." 118 Insurers
and managed care organizations also play important roles in the
purchase of prescription drugs.1 19 While these so-called third-party
payors may have had some effect in recent years in increasing price
116. Examples of generic substitution laws: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §12-22-124 (West
2001) (pharmacist permitted to substitute generic for brand); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-
619(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.025 (West 2001) (pharma-
cist required to substitute generic for brand); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4-81 (2004) (pharmacist
permitted to substitute generic for brand); GuAM CODE ANN. § 5271 (2004) (same); HAw.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-92 (Michie Supp. 1997) (pharmacist required to substitute generic
for brand).
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 829 (2004); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.03 (2004); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-64-308 (Michie 2004).
118. Michael E. Ernst et al., Prescription Medication Costs: A Study of Physician Familiarity, 9
ARCH. FAm. MED. 1002, 1004 (2000); see also OFICE OF AT-rO, NEY GEN. MIKE HATCH,
HEALTH CARE: MAKING THE MOST OF A BAD BARGAIN 15 (working draft) (explaining "eco-
nomic tension" inherent because physician selects treatment without regard to cost),
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PDF/PR/HealthCareMakingReportText.pdf (last
accessed Dec. 3, 2004); Ffisun F. G6nfil et al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs and Its Impact on
Physicians' Choice Behavior, 65J. MARKETING 79, 89 (2001). Drugs are typically dispensed by
licensed pharmacists, rather than directly by physicians. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.06 (2002). For
ethical and logistical reasons, few physicians currently dispense drugs. Statutes in each state
regulate and limit the dispensing of drugs by physicians. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1871 (West 2002) (physician dispensing of drugs permitted under limited condi-
tions); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4056 (West 2003) (physician dispensing of drugs permit-
ted under limited conditions); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11158 (West 1991) (same);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-104 (2003) (physician dispensing of drugs severely limited).
119. See Rika Onishi Mortimer, Demand for Prescription Drugs: The Effects of Man-
aged Care Pharmacy Benefits 2-3 (Nov. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Washington University of St. Louis Department of Economics), available at http://econ
wpa.wustl.edu/eps/hew/papers/9802/9802002.pdf (last accessed Dec. 3, 2004).
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competition between brand-name drugs, 120 there nevertheless is a
fundamental disconnect between the purchasers, on the one, hand,
and the physicians who are making the buying decisions, on the other.
This disconnect diminishes (though by no means eliminates) the role
that price plays in the competition between different brand-name
drugs.' 21
Brand-name pharmaceuticals are grouped into therapeutic cate-
gories known as therapeutic classes, based on the medical indications
for which drugs are approved. 122 Yet, there is typically significant dif-
ferentiation in chemical composition, mechanism of action, side-ef-
fects, effectiveness, and other attributes between the different drug
molecules in the same therapeutic class.12 3 Individual drugs within
therapeutic categories and sub-categories are also often differentiated
based on their suitability for treating particular patient populations
and sub-populations. 124 Additionally, physicians and their patients
may be uncertain about treatment side-effects and the efficacy of par-
ticular drug molecules within a class or subclass. Moreover, there is
often substantial variability and considerable uncertainty in how indi-
vidual patients will respond to particular drugs.125
Insofar as physicians choose among a group of brand-name prod-
ucts, each approved for the same or similar indications, pharmaceuti-
cal company promotional efforts assume a competitive character of a
sort. Each branded company works to persuade physicians to pre-
scribe its product instead of other products within a particular thera-
peutic category, often by portraying its product as different and better
than other drugs, if not for all patients then at least for niche groups
120. Id. at 1-2.
121. See Roy LEVY, FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY. A DISCUSSION
OF COMPETITIVE AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CHANGE 187 (1999) (Bureau
of Econ. Staff Report), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmaceutical/drugrep.pdf (last ac-
cessed Aug. 28, 2004); Fiona M. Scott Morton, Barriers to Entry, Brand Advertising, and Ge-
neric Entry in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1085, 1088 (2000).
122. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86.
123. David A. Kessler et al., Therapeutic-Class Wars-Drug Promotion in a Competitive Mar-
ketplace, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1350-53 (1994).
124. ALBERT WERTHEIMER, RICHARD LEVY & THOMAS O'CONNOR, Too MANY DRUGS?
THE CLINICAL AND ECONOMIC VALUE OF INCREMENTAL INNOVATIONS, in 14 RESEARCH IN
HUMAN CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT: INVESTING IN HEALTH; THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BEN-
EFITS OF HEALTH CARE INNOVATION 78, 86-98 (2001).
125. Id. at 78; see also Deborah Gesensway, Drug Switching: Lowering Costs vs. Adverse Inter-
actions, Potential Errors, ACP-ASIM OBSERVER, Jul.-Aug. 2000, http://www.acponline.org/
journals/news/ul-augOO/drugswitching.htm. (last accessed Dec. 3, 2004).
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of patients.' 26 Choices among products within a given therapeutic
class result from a complicated interaction involving physicians, pa-
tients, and in some circumstances, health care management compa-
nies.1 27 Branded product sellers rely upon large sales and marketing
forces to influence physicians, health care managers, and patients in
an effort to differentiate their products and promote preference for
their use. 128 Product differentiation created through these and other
tactics effectively reduces the degree of therapeutic substitutability
that physicians associate with products in the same therapeutic class.
In essence, branded companies are seeking to increase their share of
total prescriptions in a particular therapeutic class.
Product heterogeneity and variation in individual patient re-
sponse to medication are factors that create conditions in which prod-
uct differentiation and promotion-in the form of sales calls to
physicians ("detailing"),journal advertising, direct to consumer adver-
tising, and drug sampling-often become the primary driver of de-
mand for brand-name products. These marketing activities tend to
increase perceptions of product difference among prescribers and
consumers, often resulting in reduced sensitivity to prices and price
changes among purchasers. Consequently, demand tends to be rela-
tively price inelastic-more so than that which typically prevails in
other industries with differentiated products.129 The typical low price
sensitivity and inelastic demand reflect what can be minimal price
competition between different drug molecules within a therapeutic
class, and begin to explain the crucial competitive role that generics
play in this industry.
2. The Role of Hatch-Waxman and FDA Regulations
All prescription pharmaceuticals must be approved by the FDA as
safe and effective treatments for specified therapeutic indications. 130
126. John A. Rizzo, Advertising and Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry: The
Case of Antihypertensive Drugs, 42 J.L. & ECON. 95, 104-05, 107 (1999).
127. See, e.g., Caves et al., supra note 86, at 4-6; Mortimer, supra note 119.
128. Morton, supra note 121, at 1085-88; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 21;
Joel Lexchin & Barbara Mintzes, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: The Evi-
dence Says No, 21 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 194, 195 (2002); Rizzo, supra note 126, at
89-90, 107, 112-13.
129. See, e.g., Rizzo, supra note 126, at 89-90, 107, 112-13; see also NAT. INST. FOR
HEALTH CARE MGMT., CHANGING PATrERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 3 (2002)
("This pattern suggests that when there are several new NMEs [(New Molecular Entities)]
in a therapeutic class, price competition among them is limited.. . ."), available at http://
www.nihcm.org/innovations.pdf (last accessed Dec. 3, 2004).
130. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
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There are two routes to FDA approval for a new drug product: (1) a
New Drug Application ("NDA") and (2) an Abbreviated New Drug
Application ("ANDA"). 1 31 In general, the former refers to the process
followed for approval of brand-name drugs, while the latter describes
the process used by generics.13 2 NDA applicants must demonstrate the
safety and effectiveness of their products through extensive clinical
trials.' 33 However, ANDA applicants (generics) need demonstrate
only that their products are therapeutically equivalent to the Refer-
ence Listed Drugs ("RLD") already approved under NDAs
(brands).134 ANDA applicants can rely on the clinical trials that have
already demonstrated the safety and effectiveness of that RLD.135
The FDA classifies products as therapeutically equivalent if they
are pharmaceutically equivalent, in that they contain the same
amount of the identical active ingredient in precisely the same dosage
form, and bioequivalent, in that they are absorbed at the same rate
and to the same extent.1 36 Again, products approved under NDAs are
marketed as brands, while those approved under ANDAs are generally
marketed as generic equivalents. Only a generic that the FDA deems
therapeutically equivalent may be substituted for its corresponding
brand-name version by a pharmacist.13 7
The FDA's therapeutic equivalence rating that comes with ge-
neric approval assures physicians, pharmacists, and patients that the
product will have the same therapeutic efficacy and safety profile as
the brand. 138 A generic drug, therefore, is a compound that meets
131. Compare id. § 355(b) (NDA), with id. § 3550) (ANDA).
132. See generally Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (describing difference in regulatory approval routes between branded and generic
drugs); Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 2002)
(same); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 192-93
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (same).
133. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(c) (2) (viii), (d) (5)-(d) (6), 314.125(b) (2)-(b) (5), 314.126.
134. Id. § 314.94(a) (7).
135. Id.
136. See ORANGE BOOK, supra note 1, § 1.2; 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a) (7), 314.127(a),
320.24.
137. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297, 310-11 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
138. The FDA emphasized in 1997 and 1998 that brands and their generic versions are
therapeutically equivalent, even for so-called narrow therapeutic index drugs. See Letter
from Stuart L. Nightingale, M.D., Associate Commissioner for Health Affairs, Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (]an. 28, 1998),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/nightgenlett.htm (last accessed Dec. 3, 2004); Letter from
Roger L. Williams, M.D., Deputy Center Director for Pharmaceutical Science, Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to Carmen A. Ca-
tizone, Executive Director/Secretary, National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (Apr. 16,
1997), http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/ntiletter.htm (last accessed Dec. 3, 2004).
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FDA standards for bioequivalence with an existing FDA-approved
brand-name product for that product's FDA-approved uses. Generics
provide the same efficacy and safety as brand-name drugs, but typi-
cally at substantially lower prices.139
Once FDA-approved generic equivalents become available, stat-
utes in all states permit (and in some cases require) pharmacists to fill
prescriptions for the brand with a generic, unless the physician has
indicated that the prescription be filled as written.140 States enacted
these statutes to reduce aggregate drug expenditures by accelerating
generic substitution.' 41 The rules governing and encouraging generic
substitution contrast sharply with those applicable to brand-name
drugs, even for those brands indicated to treat the same disease or
condition. There are no comparable state laws encouraging, requir-
ing, or even permitting pharmacists to substitute less-expensive brand-
name alternatives for other brand-name prescription drugs. Once a
physician chooses a brand-name drug, the pharmacist is required to
fill the prescription with that same drug-unless an FDA approved,
therapeutically equivalent generic is available.
Due to these laws and regulations generics are the only FDA-ap-
proved complete therapeutic substitutes for their corresponding
brands. As a result of these factors (and others described in this Sec-
tion), the introduction of a generic is often a key factor in spurring
substantial price competition in the prescription pharmaceutical
marketplace.
3. The Role of Intellectual Property
Intellectual property, and the means by which it is attained, en-
forced, and regulated, plays a substantial role in shaping the econom-
ics of the pharmaceutical industry. Branded manufacturers devote
considerable resources to developing, patenting, testing, gaining regu-
latory approval for, and then ultimately bringing new pharmaceutical
products to market.1 42 While branded companies (and their principal
trade group, PhRMA) appear to have historically exaggerated both
139. See Kirking et al., supra note 86.
140. See statutes cited supra note 116; LEw, supra note 121, at 18.
141. ALISON MASSON & ROBERT L. STEINER, FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION
AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION
LAws 4-7 (1985).
142. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J.
HEALTH ECON. 107, 107-09 (1991); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 86; Joseph A.
DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH
ECON. 151, 152-53 (2003).
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the amount spent on this R&D, and its effectiveness in creating truly
innovative drugs,143 it is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in
this controversial debate about the levels, efficiency, and social bene-
fits of research and development expenditures by the U.S. pharma-
ceutical industry. For this Article's purposes, it is sufficient to note the
uncontroversial point that spending money on developing, securing,
and commercializing intellectual property is a significant focus of
branded manufacturers. These expenditures are motivated by the sub-
stantial profits that typically await commercially successful new phar-
maceutical products. 144
Developers of new medicines may acquire patents covering the
compound itself, the manufacturing process, or the compound's
use. 145 Moreover, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA can grant
patent extensions beyond the life of applicable patents to compensate
for the often substantial time needed to obtain necessary approvals to
bring the product to market, time that effectively limits the patent
term. 14
6
As referenced above, under Hatch-Waxman, generic companies
are allowed to bypass filing a full NDA with new safety and efficacy
studies and instead may rely on the pioneer manufacturer's work by
submitting an ANDA with "data demonstrating the generic product's
bioequivalence to the previously approved drug."1 47 When seeking ap-
proval to bring a product to market, the generic applicant must then
specifically indicate its position with respect to whether the generic
143. See, e.g., Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Will Lower Drug Prices Jeopardize Drug
Research? A Policy Fact Sheet, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS Wi, at W3 (2004); Arnold S. Relman &
Marcia Angell, America's Other Drug Problem: How the Drug Industry Distorts Medicine and Polit-
ics, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 2002, at 28-30; OFFICE OF ATromNEY GEN. MIKE HATCH, supra
note 118, at 49-50.
144. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 3 (1988).
145. FED. T.DE COMM'N, supra note 4, at 41.
146. Id. at 4; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 3-4. For instance, by statute, a
company seeking to market a generic product cannot file its ANDA until five years after
FDA approval of the originator's "new chemical entity" drug, the de facto period of exclu-
sivity, thus effectively running until the generic applicant obtains final FDA approval and
comes to market, a process which is by no means immediate. However, where an originator
drug with "new chemical entity" status obtains a patent and lists that patent in the Orange
Book as covering the drug, the time within which an ANDA filing can be accepted shrinks
to four years. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(0) (5) (D) (ii) (2000); FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 4, at
A-35 n.33; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at xiv, 41.
147. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 3; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2) (A).
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product infringes any existing patents listed by the branded manufac-
turer in the FDA's Orange Book. 148
If the generic applicant accepts those patents as valid and applica-
ble to its product, it must wait until they expire before receiving final
FDA approval to bring its product to market. 1 49 If, on the other hand,
the generic company challenges the validity or applicability of those
patents, it must indicate as such in connection with its ANDA. 15 0 The
branded manufacturer then has the opportunity to file suit to protect
its patent position. Significantly, if the branded manufacturer sues the
generic within forty-five days of receipt of the ANDA notice, the FDA,
without evaluating the validity of the lawsuit or the validity or applica-
bility of the claimed patent rights, will delay final approval of the ge-
neric for thirty months or until the resolution of any court proceeding
declaring the patent not infringed or invalid or until the patent ex-
pires, whichever come first.15
1
In sum, Congress attempted to promote generic competition
through passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act.152 At the same time, ele-
ments of Hatch-Waxman, together with other laws and regulations,
have offered significant protections to branded manufacturers and
their intellectual property. 153 These laws set the framework within
which generics play such a substantial competitive role.
148. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94 (2004); Mylan Pharms., 268 F.3d at 1326; FED. TRADE COMM'N,
supra note 4, at 5. After FDA approval, brand-name companies list patents covering their
products with the FDA in the Orange Book. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d
1348, 1351 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53.
149. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2) (A) (vii) (lI)-(III).
150. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
151. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 4, at 7. The first generic firm to file such an
ANDA challenging a patent is rewarded with a priority position after approval-i.e., no
other generic can enter the market until 180 days after either (1) the first commercial
marketing of the first generic version of the drug, or (2) the resolution of any court pro-
ceeding declaring the patent not infringed or invalid, whichever is earlier. Id. at 7, 57; 21
U.S.C. § 355(j) (5) (B) (iv).
152. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *11-*12 (Dec.
8, 2003) (Hatch-Waxman Act "was intended to facilitate earlier entry by the manufacturers
of generic drugs . . . and thereby reduce average prices paid by consumers. At the same
time, Congress wanted to preserve incentives for continued innovation by research-based
pharmaceutical companies .... ."); Mylan Pharms., 81 F. Supp. 2d at 32 ("The stated pur-
pose of this legislation [Hatch-Waxman] was to 'make available more low cost generic
drugs ....
153. Id.
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4. Generic Drugs Introduce Price Competition and Reduce
Consumer Costs in the Prescription Drug Industry
Patents and other forms of exclusivity conferred through, and
regulated by, Hatch-Waxman, provide branded drug makers a signifi-
cant, but limited, period of market exclusivity.' 54 This ability to legally,
albeit temporarily, foreclose the entry of generic competitors gives
branded manufacturers the power to set prices on brand-name prod-
ucts generally far above marginal costs, typically generating substantial
profits even taking into account expenditures associated with develop-
ing and commercializing new drug products.1 55 In fact, a great deal of
branded company behavior can best be understood as creating and
maximizing the returns from these temporary periods of market ex-
clusivity. From this perspective, the regulatory scheme functions, in
significant part, as a means for Congress to balance the long-term in-
centives for companies to continue to invest in the development and
marketing of new drugs (and the other objectives of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry) against the interests of promoting competition, eco-
nomic efficiency, and low prices.
The value of the market exclusivity conferred on brand-name
drugs depends, of course, upon how often doctors prescribe the drug.
Hence, branded pharmaceutical companies devote considerable ef-
fort to persuade doctors to prescribe their products, and consumers to
seek out those prescriptions. 156 Significantly, this form of competition
tends not to be primarily about price. Indeed, prescription choices typ-
154. See Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (recogniz-
ing provisions of Hatch-Waxman provide a five-year period of exclusivity following FDA
approval of an NDA and an additional six months of exclusivity if child-safety studies are
submitted); Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patent, supra note 86, at 118-19. Indeed, since
marginal production costs are typically low in relation to fixed costs of developing and
commercializing brand-name drugs, the inability to defer generic competition for at least
some period of time after brand-name products are launched would present a fundamen-
tal economic problem for the prescription drug industry. Generic competition would tend
to drive prices down toward marginal production costs-as potential generic competitors
could readily enter the market cheaply by copying brand-name drugs. See Reiffen & Ward,
supra note 86, at 23. In a hypothetical world with no intellectual property protection at all,
branded companies might potentially have difficulty achieving attractive rates of return on
capital invested in R&D, as well as for other costs associated with the development and
commercialization of new drugs.
155. Id.
156. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 21; Mark A. Hurwitz & Richard E. Caves,
Persuasion or Information? Promotion and the Share of Brand-Name and Generic Pharmaceuticals,
31 J.L. & ECON. 299, 302 (1988).
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ically are relatively insensitive to price.1 57 This is not to say that physi-
cians never take price into account in choosing among brands within
a particular therapeutic class or that price is never a factor in prescrip-
tion choice pre-generic entry. This is also not to say that branded com-
panies have unlimited discretion in setting price. Prior to generic
entry, the presence of other brand-name products (as well as non-
therapeutically equivalent generic drugs, i.e., generics corresponding
to other brands) in the same therapeutic class certainly exert some
real restraint on brand pricing, though, not close to the degree a ge-
neric drug exerts on its corresponding brand. 158 Moreover, the in-
tense public concern with, and scrutiny of, medical costs, 159
particularly prescription pharmaceutical costs, creates a variety of
pressures to exercise discretion in setting prices. 160
Nevertheless, vigorous advertising and promotion, known to
economists as forms of "non-price" competition, tends to be the domi-
nant mode of competition between different brand-name drugs in the
same therapeutic class. Such competition is manifestly insufficient to
force the prices down to the lower, competitive post-generic entry
levels before the advent of generic competition, as strikingly demon-
strated by the dramatic price declines that typically accompany ge-
neric entry. 161 Once the right to market exclusivity (i.e., the right to
block generic entry) expires, the economics of low production and
entry costs associated with generic drugs take over. Generic entrants
enter the market and rapidly drive average prices for the drug down,
erasing the exclusivity premium formerly embedded in the brand-
name price.1 62
As generics enter, the usual response by the branded seller is to
cease its marketing efforts for that product and switch promotional
157. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text. Increasing insurance coverage of
drug costs has reduced price sensitivity among physicians and patients. Managed care has
responded with cost-containment efforts. One of the key effects of these efforts has been to
further encourage brand to generic substitution. See Rika Onishi Mortimer, Demand for
Prescription Drugs: The Effects of Managed Care Pharmacy Benefits (Nov. 1997) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with Department of Economics, University of California at
Berkeley). Promotional efforts by branded manufacturers tend to further decrease price
sensitivity. Rizzo, supra note 126, at 107, 112-13.
158. Z. John Lu & William S. Comanor, Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals, 80 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 108, 110, 115-17 (1998); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 23-24.
159. SARA FISHER ELLISON & CATHERINE WOLFRAM, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES AND POLITI-
CAL AcTnvTy 1-5, available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/sellison/files/drugpol6.
pdf (last accessed Dec. 3, 2004).
160. See Frank & Salkever, Generic Entry, supra note 86, at 89.
161. See, e.g., Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patent, supra note 86, at 111-18.
162. Id.
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efforts to a new brand-name product. 163 The branded seller may also
decide to compete on price with the generics with certain buyers that
the manufacturer believes can substantially influence prescribing be-
havior.164 For the most part, though, the branded seller typically cedes
the vast majority of the molecule market to the generic competi-
tors.1 65 Generic manufacturers view their market as essentially com-
posed only of the total universe of sales of its corresponding brand-
name drug during the brand's period of market exclusivity. Generics
typically spend very little on promotional efforts, instead letting their
low prices and generic substitution laws serve as the principal induce-
ments for sales growth.
1 66
With the branded seller having effectively surrendered to its cor-
responding generic equivalents, its former customers shift most of
their business to generic suppliers within a short time, paying a frac-
tion of the prices they formerly did for the same drug.167 At the same
time, because the branded firm's efforts to build and maintain pre-
scription volume ceases, and because generics typically do little adver-
tising or promotion, the emergence of generic entry correlates with a
plateauing of growth, or sometimes even a slight unit sales volume
decline in the specific drug molecule, despite the substantially lower
average price. 168
In sum, institutional features of the industry-including, among
others, intellectual property protections and other forms of market
exclusivities, prescriber directed demand, product heterogeneity, and
individual variation in therapeutic effectiveness-significantly limit
price sensitivity in pharmaceutical markets. The result is often relative
price and demand inelasticity for brand-name products prior to ge-
neric entry, even where multiple brands are available in the same ther-
apeutic class and are approved for the same uses. These factors
163. J.P. MORGAN, 2003 DISTRIBUTION OUTLOOK, NORTH AMERICAN EQuiTy RESEARCH 16
(Apr. 21, 2003).
164. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at xi.
165. See Frank & Salkever, Pricing, supra note 86, at 174-75; Grabowski & Vernon, Brand
Loyalty, supra note 86, at 335-36, 339; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 29. Branded
manufacturers now typically cede over 90% of the molecule market to generics within one
year.
166. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at xi.
167. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at 27-29.
168. Because branded companies need to replace lost revenues, they typically release a
"next generation" version of the brand-name drug undergoing generic competition, which
can, and often does, have the effect of increasing total prescriptions in a therapeutic cate-
gory, even where the prescriptions of the molecule facing direct generic competition fall.
See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
SYMPOSIUMFall 2004]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
describe a marketplace in which price competition between brand-
name products tends to be limited, and so-called "non-price" competi-
tion is dominant. Prices typically only fall substantially after the low
priced generics enter the market rapidly displacing the premium
priced brands. These factors help explain why, under Hatch-Waxman,
generic entry has been a singularly powerful competitive force. 169
B. Drugs in the Same Therapeutic Category Are Not Typically
"Reasonably Interchangeable" and Thus Do Not Belong
In the Same Relevant Market in Delayed Generic
Entry Cases
By law, only products that are deemed "reasonably interchangea-
ble" belong in the same relevant product market. 170 To meet this test,
products must be both (1) functionally interchangeable and (2) eco-
nomically substitutable. 171 In most industries, the simple fact that
products are, to some degree, "functionally interchangeable" for their
intended purpose is a good indication that those products will sub-
stantially constrain each other's ability to raise price above competi-
tive levels, in other words, that they are fully economically
substitutable as well. But, as the foregoing institutional features discus-
sion makes clear, the pharmaceutical industry is decidedly not most
industries.
First, given the role of physicians and the uniqueness of individ-
ual patients, arguments that different brands are effectively "therapeu-
tically interchangeable" tend to be weak. Often, within a therapeutic
169. The powerful effects of generic competition are described in the following
sources, among others: OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 86, at 83, 87, 89 n.17, 243;
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 86, at ix, xii-xiii, 8-9, 13, 27-35; Kirking et al., supra note
86, at 578-84.
170. See Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir. 1997); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53-54 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
171. Lucas Auto. Eng'g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 275 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir.
2001). Lucas Auto states:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable in-
terchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product it-
self and substitutes for it. Where an increase in the price of one product leads to
an increase in demand for another, both products should be included in the
relevant product market. The determination of what constitutes the relevant
product market hinges, therefore, on a determination of those products to which
consumers will turn, given reasonable variations in price.
Id. (citations omitted); see also U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986,
995-99 (11th Cir. 1993); Hayden Publ'g Co. v. Cox Broad. Corp., 730 F.2d 64, 70-71 (2d
Cir. 1984); SmithKline, Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1064-65 (3d Cir. 1978);
Pinder v. Hudgins Fish Co., 570 F.2d 1209, 1219 n.17 (5th Cir. 1978).
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class, there are sub-classes of drugs, defined by their differing modes
of action, and each with a different set of side-effects. 172 And, even
within therapeutic subclasses, small differences in molecular structure,
combined with the uniqueness of individual patients, their medical
histories and conditions, can deter substitution between and among
different drug molecules. 173
This latter point is especially true when a patient is being treated
with a particular drug therapy that happens to be working. In such a
case, physicians and patients may be loath to switch to a different
treatment within a therapeutic class.1 74 It is not an insignificant fea-
ture of the economics of the pharmaceutical industry that these prod-
ucts treat disease in human beings, each of whom has a different
history, reacts differently to medications, and presents with numerous
unique individual characteristics. Switching from, say, one floor polish
to another does not carry the same implications. Accordingly, while
product heterogeneity certainly exists in most non-commodity mar-
kets, this characteristic takes on added significance in the pharmaceu-
tical industry.
Further, this aspect of the competitive landscape is not lost on the
branded pharmaceutical industry. The set of institutional features out-
lined above-such as the fact that physicians tend to focus mainly on
factors other than price as a key determinant of the drug therapy-
helps explain why the phenomenon of therapeutic switching from
one branded drug therapy to another does not constrain prices to the
rock-bottom levels that prevail only upon generic entry.
Industry defenders nevertheless point to market data that some-
times reveals "switching" from one drug therapy to another. This
"switching" evidence is put forth as "Exhibit A" for the proposition
that these drugs are therapeutically "interchangeable" and thus be-
long in the same relevant market. Yet, evidence of switching between
molecules by itself is insufficient to show reasonable interchangeabil-
ity. First, the mere fact that data reveals patients appearing to "switch"
from one therapy to another does not mean that the physician or pa-
tient believes that the two products are interchangeable. Indeed,
switches are often made because one product fails to work, or because
it has side effects that another may not.175 Thus, to a certain degree
switching may actually reveal a lack of therapeutic interchangeability.
172. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Kessler et al., supra note 123, at 1352; Gesensway, supra note 125.
175. WERTHEIMER, LEVY & O'CONNOR, supra note 124, at 86-98.
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But, even if brands were therapeutically identical, switching would be
relevant only where price is a material reason for switching. 176 Indeed,
if switching between molecules relates principally to issues of therapy,
and not price, then the presence of numerous similar treatments may
not restrain the price of other brands to competitive levels. Put an-
other way, that price is not the principal reason why switching tends to
occur (outside of substitution that occurs from a brand to its FDA-
rated generic equivalents upon generic entry), helps explain why the
existence of many brands in a therapeutic class generally does not
bring prices down close to the post-generic entry competitive levels.
The law recognizes the dichotomy between mere substitutability
based upon similarity in use and substitutability based on relative dif-
ferences in price. For instance, the economic concept of cross-price
elasticity of demand measures the degree to which products are "eco-
nomic substitutes," i.e., whether the relative change in the price of
one causes commensurate shifts in sales to, or from, the other. As one
court puts it:
When one gets down to brass tacks, or any other specific product,
almost all products have substitutes: even buses, skywriters and
road signs compete with newspapers for advertising. Antitrust law,
however, is only concerned with products reasonably interchangea-
ble with one another, in other words, products for which there is
some cross elasticity of demand. 177
Evidence that two products are sometimes, or even often, substi-
tuted for one another because of functional similarities is, without a
finding of significant positive cross-price elasticity of demand, not use-
ful for purposes of defining relevant markets. 178 Yet, due to the insti-
176. Cf SmithKline Corp., 575 F.2d at 1063-64 (holding that two drug molecules that
could be used for the same purpose were not part of the same market because cross-price
elasticity between the two was absent).
177. Auburn News Co., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 504 F. Supp. 292, 302 (D.R.I.
1980) (citing Brown Shoe, Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)), rev'd on other grounds,
659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981). In addition, the degree of cross-elasticity of demand must be
significant. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A high
cross elasticity of demand indicates that products are close substitutes, and should proba-
bly be treated as part of the same market. A low or zero cross elasticity of demand is evi-
dence that products do not compete in the same relevant market."); Geneva Pharms.
Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (requiring "suffi-
cient cross-elasticity of demand"); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1078 (D.D.C.
1997) (stating that low cross-elasticity results in exclusion of products in antitrust market).
178. See, e.g., Telecor Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d
1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Reasonable interchangeability does not depend on product
similarity . . . ."); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53-54 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
("The test of reasonable interchangeability, however, required the District Court to con-
sider only substitutes that constrain pricing in the reasonably foreseeable future . . .");
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tutional features of the pharmaceutical industry179 it is often the case
that cross-price elasticity of demand between different drug molecules
is relatively low. Indeed, as discussed above, when a brand experiences
FDA-rated generic competition, the price of the generic, which enters
the market at a significant discount to the pre-generic entry brand
price, then often drops twenty to forty percent of the pre-generic en-
try branded price over a matter of months.180 Purchasers of the brand
rapidly substitute the generic until the vast majority of the "molecule
market," sometimes well-above ninety percent, becomes generic.181
Pertinent here, despite the fact that the average price drops to as low
as twenty percent of the pre-generic entry level, total prescriptions of
the molecule stay flat and even drop over time as the branded manu-
facturer stops promoting the product.18 2 Thus, the relative price of
one molecule drops substantially with respect to most of the other
drugs in the therapeutic class, without a substantial shift in volume
from the now relatively higher priced alternative brand-name drugs,
to the newly low priced alternative. This typical pattern indicates that
cross-price elasticity of demand between drugs in a therapeutic class is
low. The drop in the price of one drug molecule that occurs with
generic entry tends not to result in the kind of volume shifts from
other drugs in the therapeutic class that would be expected if cross-
price elasticity of demand were relatively high.
Thus, different drug molecules within the same therapeutic class,
despite possible therapeutic similarities, tend not to be close eco-
nomic substitutes for purposes of defining relevant markets in delayed
generic entry cases. This, once again, explains why the entry of a ge-
neric has such a substantial competitive effect even though there may
U.S. Anchor Mfg., 7 F.3d at 995-99 (finding despite functional interchangeability, absence
of price-related demand and supply elasticities prevents products from residing in same
market); United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242, 248 & n.1 (8th Cir.
1989) (finding that sugar and high fructose corn syrup, though functionally interchangea-
ble, do not reside in the same antitrust product market because "a small change in the
price of HFCS would have little or no effect on the demand for sugar" such that cross-
elasticity of demand is low, despite evidence of actual substitution of corn syrup for sugar
by consumers); Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1074, 1080 (finding, on basis of absence of cross-
elasticity of demand, that products reside in separate product markets despite functional
interchangeability of products); id. at 1075 ("[T] he mere fact that a firm may be termed a
competitor in the overall marketplace does not necessarily require that it be included in
the relevant product market for antitrust purposes.").
179. See supra Part 11A.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.
1977).
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be several drugs in a particular therapeutic class of drugs. This also, of
course, means that branded companies typically possess market power
with respect to their brands before generics enter. As Judge Posner
has recognized, "[I] n an industry such as pharmaceuticals many of the
products . . .are patented. The sellers may be selling goods that al-
though close substitutes are not perfect substitutes, with the result that
each seller has some monopoly power."'183
Industry defenders nevertheless suggest that the only way to de-
fine a relevant market in this context is to conduct a detailed quantita-
tive analysis of cross-price elasticity of demand among different brand-
name products prior to generic entry. Such a study would presumably
constitute an effort to determine quantitatively whether delaying ge-
neric competition preserved monopoly power by examining the price
restraining effects on the brand by existing branded competitors. In
cases where no direct evidence of monopoly power is available, such a
study might assist in determining whether the entry of an additional
source of competition would have a substantial effect on prices. In
delayed generic entry cases, however, where direct evidence is availa-
ble in abundance, such a formal price elasticity study would be wholly
unnecessary and would likely be a time-consuming and costly
distraction.
This is so for at least two reasons. First, as shown above, the direct
proof of supracompetitive pricing in these cases not only obviates the
need for indirect proof entirely, but also simultaneously serves as
proof that the relevant market must be limited to the molecule. Sec-
ond, such a quantitative analysis, at best, would merely reflect the
competitive conditions existing before the lifting of the restraint on
generic competition. In other words, at best the study would provide a
snapshot in time of the price restraining effects of existing competi-
tion. Yet, analyzing actual market conditions pre-generic entry as a
baseline to define and assess whether substantial market power is be-
ing exercised is improper because it falls prey to what is commonly
known as the "cellophane fallacy." 184 The study of a firm's pricing in
183. Morse, supra note 81, at 676, 670 n.167.
184. CARLTON & PERLOFF, SECOND EDITION, supra note 39, at 804-06. The cellophane
fallacy refers to the Supreme Court's expansive definition of a relevant market in United
States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), to include all packing materi-
als rather than just cellophane because evidence revealed that consumers switched to other
materials when the price of cellophane went up. Economists generally consider this hold-
ing to be wrong, because, among other reasons, the Court overlooked record evidence that
cellophane prices vastly exceeded marginal cost. CARLTON & PERLOFF, SECOND EDITION,
supra note 39. More recently, the Supreme Court has noted that even those already exercis-
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the face of existing competition as a means to rule out the present
exercise of market power is considered fallacious. This is because a
snapshot look at a firm's pricing at any point in time should always
reveal significant sources of discipline limiting further price increases.
All firms, even those presently exercising monopoly power, face pric-
ing discipline at some level. 185
Indeed, economics teaches that even a true sole-seller monopolist
will not increase its prices without limit.186 Instead, such a monopolist
will raise prices to the point where other products become viable sub-
stitutes to consumers (or to the point at which consumers will forego
the product altogether) solely because the monopolist's price is so
high. 187 In short, the monopolist will price to the level the market will
bear. As Judge Learned Hand explained in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America,188 "substitutes are available for almost all commodities,
and to raise the price enough is to evoke them."189 Any hypothetical
quantitative study of cross-elasticity revealing that an incumbent firm
faces substantial discipline in its ability to raise prices does not re-
present evidence that the firm is not exercising monopoly power dur-
ing the period under study. Put another way, the fact that the seller
cannot raise prices even higher than the prevailing price does not
mean that the selle- lacks market power; it may simply mean it has
already exercised it.190
Therefore, quantitative analysis of the price constraining effects
of existing competition pre-generic entry is most appropriately used
to provide insight about whether particular conduct going fonard
could result in the maintenance, enhancement, or creation of market
ing market power may be constrained in their ability to raise price, and that evidence of
significant price constraints does not foreclose a finding of the present exercise of market
power. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 471 (1992).
185. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 63 F.3d at 105 (explaining the cellophane fallacy); Viscusi
ET AL., supra note 65, at 261 ("A rational monopolist would, in fact, raise price until its
product became a substitute for alternatives. Hence, substitutes in consumption should be
evaluated at prices that are reasonably close to marginal costs."); RicHARD A. POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAw 150 (2d ed. 2001) ("[A] monopolist always tries to sell in the elastic portion of
his demand curve" and therefore "at a high enough price, even poor substitutes look good
to the consumer.").
186. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 470-71.
187. Id.
188. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
189. Id. at 426.
190. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 44, at 977-79; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 471
("The existence of significant substitution in the event of further price increases or even at
the current price does not tell us whether the defendant already exercises significant market
power." (internal quotation omitted)).
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power relative to existing circumstances. But, in cases where there is
clear and largely undisputed evidence of supracompetitive pricing,
quantitative analysis of cross-price elasticity of demand will likely not
clarify the competitive issues, but rather would tend to yield mislead-
ing results.
In sum, determining quantitatively whether cross-price elasticity
of demand between molecules pre-generic entry is low (and thus
brand-name drugs are not close economic substitutes) or high (poten-
tially reflecting the cellophane fallacy) would not be particularly use-
ful in the context of delayed generic entry cases. Rather, the focus
here should be on the following salient fact: that by restraining ge-
neric competition, the branded company delays the advent of substan-
tially lower prices. The fact that existing competitors may restrain
price, but not sufficiently to make the challenged conduct competi-
tively insignificant, means that the pre-existing competitors do not be-
long in the market relevant to analyzing the antitrust claims in
question in delayed generic entry cases. As one commentary explains,
even where "the degree of substitutability is very high," products are
not in the same relevant market "unless the availability of one effec-
tively limited the price of the other to the competitive level or some-
thing slightly above." 191 The fact that generics hive such a significant
effect on prices means that the relevant market in delayed generic en-
try cases is limited to the molecule.
C. Extensive "Non-Price" Competition Within a Therapeutic Class
Does Not Mean that the Relevant Market is Broader
than the Molecule in Delayed Generic
Entry Cases
Industry defenders point to "non-price" competition that occurs
between brands as proof that the relevant market in delayed generic
entry cases will likely include an entire therapeutic class. 192 This argu-
ment is, however, flawed for at least two reasons. First, as discussed
above, promotion in the pharmaceutical industry tends to increase per-
ceptions of differentiation among products, lowering price sensitivi-
191. 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 16, 507a; see also Coastal Fuels, Inc.
v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 197 ("The definition of relevant market de-
pends upon economic restraints which prevent sellers from raising prices above competi-
tive levels." (internal quotations omitted)); VIscusi ET AL., supra note 65, at 261; POSNER,
supra note 185, at 150-51.
192. Morse, supra note 81, at 675.
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ties and demand elasticities.1 93 This result has the effect of increasing
levels of market power for firms that engage in it. Accordingly, the
proliferation of non-price competition in the form of massive promo-
tional spending is one of the features of the industry indicating that
the relevant market in delayed generic entry cases is limited to the
molecule, and not the other way around.
Second, industry defenders rarely suggest that, on net, consumers
are usually better off when generic entry is delayed. While it is true
that the branded manufacturer cuts promotional spending on the
brand-name product facing therapeutically equivalent generic compe-
tition, branded firms typically plow that money back into promoting a
different brand-name product, namely, one that has remaining patent
life. 194 Thus, to the extent the argument is that pharmaceutical adver-
tising is always good for consumers-despite its inflationary effect on
prices-there is no evidence that drug companies spend less overall
on promotion due to the growth in importance of generic drugs over
time.
Furthermore, the fact that the totl number of prescriptions of a
particular drug molecule (brand plus generic) tends to plateau or
even fall post generic entry does not prove that total prescription drug
output falls as a result of generic entry. Indeed, generic entry tends to
induce branded manufacturers to replace lost revenues with new ver-
sions of the old products (with new dosage forms, delivery mecha-
nisms, etc.) known as "line extensions" or "next generation"
products. 195 As a recent FTC report explains: "The generic competi-
tion spurred by Hatch-Waxman has forced brand-name firms to come
up with new products to replenish their revenue streams. Brand-name
companies have often introduced Incrementally Modified Drugs
("IMDs") for which they can seek patent protection to lessen the im-
pact of this generic competition." 196 This competitive process can
have the effect of increasing total prescription sales in a therapeutic
class. These "line extensions" then become the focus of a new promo-
tional campaign, inducing additional overall sales. To that extent, it is
simply a fallacy to suggest that generic entry causes "output" to fall in
any sense that would be harmful to consumers. 19 7
193. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text; Rizzo, supra note 126, at 99-100;
Morton, supra note 121, at 1097.
194. J.P. MORGAN, supra note 163, at 16.
195. J.P. MORGAN, supra note 163, at 16.
196. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 4, ch. 3, at 11.
197. See Morse, supra note 81, at 675.
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Ultimately, however, the point here is that non-price competition
does not indicate "reasonable interchangeability" of different brands,
but rather indicates the opposite. This confirms what all of the cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence reveals-that the relevant market is
limited to the molecule in delayed generic entry cases.
In sum, the various institutional features of the pharmaceutical
industry described in this section, extensive efforts at product differ-
entiation between drug molecules, the presence of non-price competi-
tion, the relatively low price sensitivity and cross-elasticity of demand
between brands constitute substantial-if not overwhelming-circum-
stantial evidence that different brand drugs in a therapeutic class are
not generally close economic substitutes for purposes of analyzing
delayed generic entry cases, and thus are not "reasonably interchange-
able" as the term is used in the context of relevant market definition.
Therefore, even if the direct evidence of market power in delayed ge-
neric entry cases is ignored or disregarded, the indirect evidence
tends to confirm that the relevant market is limited to the molecule in
these cases, clearly showing that a branded company maintains sub-
stantial market power by forestalling generic entry.
11. Traditional Conceptions of Market Power and
Anticompetitive Effects Apply to the
Pharmaceutical Industry
As discussed above, the principal response of industry defenders
to the use and implications of the direct evidence of monopoly power
and anticompetitive effects in delayed generic entry cases involves (1)
downplaying the significance of the direct evidence, (2) asserting the
necessity of the indirect proof, and (3) ignoring or distorting the im-
plications of the institutional features of the industry on the relevant
market analysis. Perhaps the most diversionary (and fallacious) of the
industry's arguments, however, is the suggestion that standard mea-
sures of market power and anticompetitive effects should be aban-
doned in industries, like the pharmaceutical industry, in which the
up-front fixed costs, such as R&D, tend to be large.198 In essence, de-
fenders fall back on arguments used to justify the granting and enforc-
ing of intellectual property rights or regulatory exclusivities to justify
extended periods of supracompetitive pricing. Industry defenders
claim that imposing standard definitions of monopoly power and an-
ticompetitive effects under these circumstances would effectively
198. See Morse, supra note 81, at 674.
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make every brand "a monopoly," subject to liability under the Sher-
man Act, and thereby purportedly discourage investments in R&D.
This entire argument is a non-sequitur.
It must be noted at the outset of this discussion that the mere
assertion of this defense implicitly concedes the central point of this
Article, i.e., that by delaying generic entry, firms maintain substantial
market power and cause anticompetitive effects as these terms have
traditionally been defined in the fields of both law and economics. If a
firm by virtue of certain conduct (such as the assertion of patent or
regulatory rights) enables itself to profitably charge prices substan-
tially above its marginal costs or the competitive level-sufficient to
recover such non-marginal costs as R&D expenditures-that firm has
by definition maintained or created monopoly power, and that con-
duct has thereby yielded anticompetitive effects as traditionally recog-
nized by the antitrust laws.
Indeed, one of the main reasons patents and regulatory exclusivi-
ties were established in the first place was to permit firms to exclude
competitors and charge supracompetitive prices in order to be able to
recover fixed and up-front costs, thereby encouraging investments in
innovation. That is to say, the point of granting rights to marketing
exclusivity is that the anticompetitive harms flowing from the exercise
of that power are, it is argued, offset by corresponding benefits to long-
run competition that the enhanced market power allows. Professors
Baumol and Ordover explain in a more straightforward fashion the
point industry defenders are implicitly making:
The Schumpeterian analysis tells us that the innovator obtains its
reward via the temporary (and generally desirable) monopoly
power that priority can confer on it by permitting it to outperform
its rivals until they are able to respond through imitation or by
some other means. Obviously, patents are a means to increase this
incentive by providing legal support for such monopoly power and,
perhaps, by extending the period during which it endures.199
In the pharmaceutical industry, where fixed costs are often high,
Congress intended for Hatch-Waxman, in conjunction with intellec-
tual property rights, to balance the incentives for investments in inno-
vation with the needs of consumers and the public for affordable
199. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & JANuSz A. ORDOVER, ANTITRUST: SOURCE OF DYNAMIC AND
STATIC INEFFICIENCIES?, ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 84 (ThomasJorde et
al. eds., 1992).
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medications.200 Hatch-Waxman contains a trade-off: short-run an-
ticompetitive effects for hoped-for long-run dynamic benefits. Signifi-
cantly, these dynamic benefits, to the extent that they exist, flow from
the substantial market power conferred upon branded manufacturers
through the exclusivity grant. That is to say, there could be no positive
long-run benefits without the endurance of the short-run competitive
welfare harms. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in
a debate about whether the patent system and Hatch-Waxman strike
the appropriate balance between short and long term competitive ef-
fects or whether the industry is sufficiently innovative to merit the ex-
clusivity rights that are conferred through this scheme, 201 it is clear
that this industry defense constitutes an implicit concession that delay-
ing generic entry confers substantial market power and causes short-
run anticompetitive effects as those terms have traditionally been
defined.202
200. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 628 (E.D. Mich.
2000), affd, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30,
32 (D.D.C. 2000).
201. There is a vast literature on the intersection between intellectual property and
antitrust law. See, e.g., FED TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1-39 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last accessed Dec. 3, 2004). This subject is largely beyond
the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to note that while intellectual property law and
antitrust law share common goals of promoting competition and consumer welfare, they
do so in different ways. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Striking a Delicate Balance: Intellectual
Property, Antitrust, Contract, and Standardization in the Computer Industry, 12 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 31 (1998). O'Rourke states:
Antitrust law seeks to encourage innovation by safeguarding the competitive pro-
cess [while] intellectual property grants exclusive rights that protect against the
same competition antitrust was meant to foster.... [Tbo assume that there [is] no
conflict between [the two] ... is to ignore that antitrust and intellectual property
use quite different means in attempting to achieve their respective ends.
Id.
202. Mr. Morse is correct that "market power cannot be presumed from the existence
of a patent." Morse, supra note 81, at 673-74. But, of course, claimants in delayed generic
entry cases do not claim that market power flows from the mere existence of the patent or
exclusivity grant. Rather, as this Article notes, under the peculiar conditions under which
prescription drugs are sold, including the applicable laws and regulations, branded manu-
facturers are typically empowered to inflate prices above competitive levels. When that
power is extended beyond the limitations of the patent or other exclusivity grant, what was
once the legal exercise of market power becomes the possible unauthorized exercise of
market power. This Article simply advocates the application of traditional antitrust princi-
ples to these cases. See In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 355 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (D.N.J.
2004) ("Although a patent holder lawfully acquires a monopoly power via the patent pro-
cess, it subsequently may violate the second prong of the Crinnell test by unlawfully main-
taining that monopoly power." (citation omitted)); id. at 532 ("[I]f a patent-holder's
actions unlawfully maintain otherwise lawful monopoly power.., such actions could lead
to anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.").
(Vol. 39
SYMPOSIUM
Further, the argument that traditional definitions of monopoly
power and anticompetitive effects should not apply in delayed generic
entry cases because it would amount to deeming all branded compa-
nies "monopolists" conflates wholly distinct elements of a Section 2
claim. The first element (possession of monopoly power) is necessary,
but not sufficient to establish a Section 2 violation. Mere possession of
monopoly power is not illegal by itself It is only through the satisfaction
of the second element-the illegal willful acquisition or maintenance
of that power-that an entity possessing substantial market power
faces liability.2 03 This Article, and relevant market/market power anal-
ysis more generally, are concerned only with the distinct requirements
of satisfying the first element. In a Section 2 case, where a plaintiff
establishes monopoly power, liability only conceivably attaches where
a plaintiff succeeds in proving the second element. Thus, the sup-
posed "public policy" problem with the application of traditional no-
tions of market power and anticompetitive effects in the
pharmaceutical context is illusory. Branded firms can only be held
liable under Section 2 if improper means were used to block generics,
such as through an anticompetitive scheme designed to
monopolize. 20 4
Accordingly, the mere innocent assertion of legitimate patent
rights resulting in delayed generic entry is not, standing alone, an an-
titrust violation even though that conduct permits the maintenance of
substantial market power and has anticompetitive effects. Again, the
question of whether the conduct confers substantial market power is
not the same as the question of whether the challenged conduct
amounts to a Section 2 violation. This analysis implies at least two pos-
sible outcomes: (1) the court determines that the challenged conduct
constitutes proper enforcement or defense of intellectual property
right or Hatch-Waxman exclusivity, or (2) the court determines that
the conduct exceeded the scope of those rights and was improper. In
the former case, the exercise of monopoly power is potentially im-
mune; in the latter it can be subject to liability.
The options are so limited because "[a] patent affords no immu-
nity for monopoly not fairly or plainly within the grant."20 5 To the
203. See, e.g., Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 243,
252 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[A claimant] must show more than monopoly power in order to
establish a Section 2 violation; [it] must also show that the defendant exercised its power in
an anticompetitive fashion.").
204. See e.g., In re Remeron, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 531-32.
205. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942); see also United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 300 (1948) ("[T]he precise terms of the [patent] grant
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extent that the branded firm has exceeded the legitimate scope of its
patent or other exclusivity grant, the firm has, by definition, conferred
upon itself more protection against competition than the competitive
balance established by those laws will allow.2 0 6 As pointed out by
professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley in this context,
[short term] competitive harms are tolerable if-but only if-they
are part of the supracompetitive return the government has
granted to an [intellectual property] owner under a social policy
designed to encourage innovation. [Intellectual property] law re-
quires that we tolerate departures from a competitive marketplace,
but only where legitimate [intellectual property] rights in fact exist
and are infringed.20 7
Returning one last time to the murder case analogy, this industry
defense is akin to asserting that the accused did not actually stab the
victim-the same victim that the accused admitted stabbing-because
the stabbing was justifiable on grounds of self-defense. This conten-
tion represents not only an obvious non-sequitur, but it reflects an
implicit admission that the defendant actually did the yery thing he
was accused of doing. Similarly, here the question of whether branded
manufacturers should be permitted to engage in conduct designed to
define the limits of a patentee's monopoly and the area in which the patentee is freed from
competition ... . ."); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th
Cir. 2003) ("We recognize the patent exception to antitrust liability, but also recognize that
the exception is limited by the terms of the patent and the statutory rights granted to the
patentee.").
206. See, for example, the following statement by Robert Harmon:
It should not be supposed, however, that there are no public costs associated with
the right to exclude. These include inflated prices (invariably absorbed by the
consumer), which frequently accompany exclusive rights, and overinvestment.
The patent system seeks to maintain an efficient balance between incentives to
create and commercialize and the public costs engendered by these incentives.
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.2, at 12 (2003) (citations
omitted).
207. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 4, at 1747. These authors elaborate on this concept
specifically in the context of Section 1 claims relating to so-called "reverse payment" agree-
ments in which branded manufacturers pay generic companies to stay off the market:
The purpose of the rule of reason is to determine whether, on balance, a practice
is reasonably likely to be anticompetitive or competitively harmless-that is,
whether it yields lower or higher market-wide output. By contrast, patent policy
encompasses a set of judgments about the proper tradeoff between competition
and the incentive to innovate over the long run. Antitrust's rule of reason was not
designed for such judgments and is not adept at making them. A properly de-
fined per se rule represents a judicial judgment that a particular restraint is so
highly likely to be anticompetitive-that is, output reducing and price increasing
in the short run-that a full inquiry into market power and applicable defenses is
not worth the court's trouble.
Id. at 1729 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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enhance and extend their market exclusivities is wholly distinct from
analyzing whether that conduct has, or does not have, certain eco-
nomic effects on prices and output.
In the final analysis, shorn of the patent (or other legitimate
rights to market exclusivity), industry defenders have very little to
stand on. They are left arguing that antitrust laws should not be con-
cerned about branded firms preserving monopoly power by fraudu-
lently enforcing invalid patents or buying off competitors. Yet, they
reach this conclusion in large part by looking to the very intellectual
property rights that are being challenged in the underlying cases.
Where branded companies pay generic manufacturers not to
compete, or unilaterally game the Hatch-Waxman and/or patent sys-
tem to keep generics off the market, these companies have, by doing
so, extended the period during which they can profitably maintain
substantial sales at supracompetitive prices. Assuming the underlying
conduct is separately found to be improper, the conduct has effec-
tively converted what had been a legal right to exclude competitors
and exercise market power-a power existing by virtue of a patent or
FDA-granted period of exclusivity-into an improper and unautho-
rized use of that power. More narrowly, the extension of exclusivity
invariably involves the continued exercise of monopoly power, yield-
ing substantial anticompetitive effects as these terms have traditionally
been defined. There is no legitimate reason to alter those traditional
definitions in delayed generic entry cases.
Conclusion
As the analysis of the unique institutional features of the pharma-
ceutical industry set out above reveals, generics are a critical source of
price competition in an industry where substantial price competition
is lacking despite a proliferation of drug products. In the end, after
the underbrush of the industry arguments are cleared away, the mar-
ket power issues in delayed generic entry cases are rather
straightforward.
Where the anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct are
not the subject of serious debate, requiring the plaintiffs to prove indi-
rectly what is already known directly is entirely unnecessary. Worse
than that, relevant market analysis in delayed generic entry cases, if
performed incorrectly by failing to take into account the complex in-
stitutional features of the pharmaceutical industry as well as the impli-
cations of the direct evidence itself, distracts from the actual
competitive issues in these cases. The root of the problem is that the
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indirect method creates unnecessary hurdles that can obscure what all
parties effectively recognize in these cases: that delaying generic entry
preserves monopoly power and generates anticompetitive effects.
